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SYSTEM LEVEL RISK ANALYSIS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL 





This dissertation is an investigation of the system level risk of electromagnetic and 
lightning effects in aircraft. It begins with an analysis to define a system, and a discussion of 
emergence as a characteristic of a system. Against this backdrop, risk is defined as an undesirable 
emergent property of a system. A procedure to translate the system level non-functional attributes 
to lower level functional requirements is developed. With this foundation, a model for risk 
analysis, resolution and management is developed by employing the standard risk model. The 
developed risk model is applied to evaluation of electromagnetic environmental effects and 
lightning effects in aircraft. Examples are shown to demonstrate the validity of the model. Object 
Process Methodology and systems thinking principles are used extensively throughout this work. 
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This work investigates the system level risk analysis of electromagnetic effects and 
lightning effects in aircraft. The risks of electromagnetic and lightning environmental effects in 
aircraft systems have been one of the major safety concerns to aircraft manufacturers and airlines 
since the early days of aviation. These safety concerns are regulated by governmental authorities 
such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) with certification processes, and aircraft manufacturers have obligation to prove the safety 
of manufactured aircraft from these hazardous effects in order to sell the aircraft to airlines, 
government, and individual customers. It is noteworthy that these electromagnetic concerns have 
been exacerbated in recent years due to (1) increased electromagnetic footprint in aircraft since the 
early 1990s with the introduction of portable electronic devices and passengers activities such as 
emailing, web browsing, text messaging, and mobile audio/video service usage, (2) growing 
application of composite materials for airframes, which do not provide protection against 
electromagnetic effects as well as aluminum material does, and (3) modern aircraft’s increasing 
dependency on electronics for communications, navigation and surveillance functions, and flight 
control functions (fly-by-wire). For these reasons, the need to assess, evaluate, mitigate and 
manage electromagnetic and lightning risks has been growing and is greater than ever.  
Considering the complex, inter-related, global, and dynamic nature of electromagnetic 
environmental and lightning effects, we find application of systems engineering to these 
electromagnetic risks necessary, useful and beneficial. In particular, in our research, we utilize the 
standard risk model as a main tool in conjunction with the computer aided fault tree analysis tool 
for systems risk analysis. The standard risk model is an internationally recognized risk analysis 
method and provides benefits of clearly expressed causality and event drivers which let us conduct 
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risk mitigation and management activities in a logical manner. Based on this model, several 
example studies are performed to validate the model. The methodology developed in this 
dissertation provides a comprehensive risk modeling, which can be used widely in many aviation 
risk analysis situations. Another practical reason for the need of systems engineering in this area 
is the current organizational trend of aerospace companies of becoming a systems integration and 
testing house. Thus there are concerted efforts in aerospace industry to use systems engineering 
approach for engineering issues in general and the electromagnetic and lightning issues in 
particular. 
The primary purpose of this work is to provide clarity to the fundamental nature of system 
level risk and to develop a risk analysis methodology with increased rigor. A secondary purpose 
is to show how the developed methodology can be used to analyze specific problems of 
electromagnetic and lightning risks. This work leverages prior works of several authors who did 
research in the area of system level risk analysis of electromagnetic interference. However, this 
work goes beyond prior works by incorporating the systems risk analysis principles fully in all 
areas of electromagnetic environmental effects including lightning. Risk is discussed in this work 
as an emergent property of systems. Emergence as a system characteristic has been studied 
carefully in the past by many authors and we clarify the meaning of risk in the context of 
emergence theory. We may call this approach an ontological view. The ontological view on risk 
is stimulating and productive when it is applied to concrete aviation situations. This view led the 
author to adopt Object Process Methodology (OPM) modeling language for this work, which was 
originally developed with a similar ontological motivation. Several systems thinking principles are 
introduced and expanded. These systems thinking principles play a significant role in developing 
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ideas and approaches in this work. The OPM system modeling language and systems thinking 
principles are used extensively for this research project.  
It is noted that there has been a cultural gap between the electromagnetics community and 
systems engineering community, and collaborative research activities of the two disciplines are 
rarely found. Because of the systemic effects of electromagnetic energy, and maturity of systems 
engineering and electromagnetics engineering, significant results would be generated when the 
two disciplines are considered together. This work is one of the first serious attempts to bridge the 
gap between the two disciplines via risk analysis. It is expected that streamlining the engineering 
electromagnetic risk analysis processes using the method expounded in this research will help the 
aviation industry and improve the risk management effectiveness over the engineering lifecycle. 
Employing the model developed in this work should significantly enhance the safety of aircraft 
against electromagnetic environmental threats. 
The discussion is introduced in Chapter 1 which provides definition and various properties 
of a system. Emergence characteristic of a system is discussed and system level risk is defined as 
an undesirable emergent property of a system. Processes of how system level quality attributes can 
be translated into requirements at the subsystem and component level are shown in Chapter 2. 
Development of a general risk analysis and mitigation model is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
shows the details of electromagnetic environmental risk analysis in aircraft. The lightning risk 
analysis in aircraft is conducted in Chapter 5. The test procedures and results for lightning risk 
mitigation are given in Chapter 6. Further validation of the developed risk analysis approach is 
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The topic of the dissertation is the system level risk analysis of electromagnetic 
environmental effects and lightning effects in aircraft for both steady state and transient events. 
The risk of electromagnetic and lightning threats has been known and of concern since the early days of 
aviation [1]. Although the risk analysis of electromagnetic interference at a system level has been 
performed by several authors in the past [2,3,4,5], a comprehensive risk study of both 
electromagnetic and lightning effects at an aircraft system level has not been accomplished in 
public literature. The aircraft structure and behavior are quite complex, and so are the effects of 
electromagnetic threats in aircraft [6]. In order to evaluate such complexity adequately, a systems 
engineering approach is desired and necessary. Systems engineering is an application of the 
general systems theory to engineering architectures [7,8]. We note that application of systems 
theory and systems thinking is quite helpful not only to the design and development of aircraft but 
also to the effective risk evaluation, resolution, and management. To understand how systems 
thinking can be helpful in this context, we must understand what a system is [9]. Even though we 
generally have an intuitive understanding of what the term means, it is prudent to make the term 
explicitly clear in order to use the systems theory and systems thinking properly.  
1.1 System and Emergence 
System is an integrated collection of parts or subsystems that is highly organized to 
accomplish an overall goal. The system may receive various inputs, which go through certain 
processes in the system to produce outputs, which ideally produce overall desired goals. A system 
is usually made up of many smaller subsystems or components. A complex entity may be made 
up of many structures, functions, services, products, groups and individuals. If one part of the 
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system is changed, the nature of the overall system could be changed as well. Thus the changes in 
the system is systemic, meaning the changes affect the entire system. 
Systems range widely. For example, there are mechanical systems such as an air-
conditioning unit, biological systems such as a heart, human/mechanical systems such as a boy 
riding a bicycle, ecological systems such as animals living in a forest, and social systems such as 
schools, churches, or economic activities. In engineering world, we can classify systems into two 
groups: technical computer-based systems and socio-technical systems. A technical computer-
based system includes hardware and software but operators and operational processes are not part 
of the system. A technical computer-based system is not self-aware. A socio-technical system 
includes technical computer-based systems but it also includes operational processes and people 
who use and interact with the technical systems. A socio-technical system is self-aware. Complex 
systems are comprised of numerous subsystems and components. The transportation systems 
shown in Fig. 1 are examples of socio-technical systems. The transportation system evolution in 
 








Fig. 1 illustrates that a system may evolve from a simple system to a complex system with multiple 
subsystems. Subsystems or components are arranged in hierarchies and organized to accomplish 
the overall goals of the system. Each subsystem or component has its modularity property, and 
includes various inputs, processes, and outputs that achieve the goals of the subsystem. Complex 
systems usually interact with their environments and are, thus, open systems. 
A high-functioning system continually operates on a feedback among its various parts to 
ensure they remain aligned and focused on achieving the goals. If any of the parts or activities in 
the system are weakened or misaligned, the system makes necessary adjustments to achieve its 
goals. Thus a pile of dirt is not a system. If you remove a piece of dirt, you still have a pile of dirt. 
However, a functioning airplane is a system. Remove the engines and you no longer have a 
working airplane. An airplane is a system because of new functions an airplane possesses, such as 
a function of transporting people and cargo. This function is only found in an aircraft as a system 
and is not found in elements or entities when they are individually considered. This new function, 
emerged only as a system, is the power and magic of a system. The new emergent function is what 
makes a system greater than the sum of parts. This feature of a system was stated by the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle more than two thousand years ago as follows: “The whole is something 
beside the parts [10].” Thus we may summarize it by saying that a system is comprised of entities 
and their relationships, and the new functionality as a system is greater than the sum of the 
functions of individual entities considered separately. This notion of a system indicates the 
following two important points:  
1. A system is comprised of entities that interact or are interrelated. 
2. When the entities interact together, a function appears that is other than or greater than 
the functions of the individual entities. 
4 
The first point above is simply about the composition of a system being entities and their 
relationships. The second point above is about the characteristic of a system: a functionality of a 
system is other than or greater than sum of functions of individual entities. This describes what is 
called emergence [11,12,13]. Emergence appears when a system operates. Engineers build systems 
to obtain desired emergence [14,15,16] and the goal of systems thinking is to understand 
emergence of a system. Thus the essential feature of a system is that new functions emerge from 
the designed engineering system.  Sand and a glass tube are shown in Fig. 2. Sand is material found 
in nature and does not have any function as is. The funnel shaped glass tube simply constricts a 
flow of fluid. However, when two are brought together, a new function appears: timekeeping. 
Individual element when considered separately does not show any trace of a timekeeping function. 
When they are together, a new informational system emerges by design. The second category of 
emergence is performance. We may consider the timekeeping performance of the hourglass such 
as how accurately the hourglass keeps time. This performance property is considered an emergence 
of the system. The third category of emergence is a set of operational attributes such as 
maintainability, reliability, safety or operability. These attributes are called the “ilities.” Whereas 
function and performance create values immediately, the ilities tend to appear over the lifecycle 
 
 
Figure 2. Emergent function from sand and a funnel 
+ =      timekeeping
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of a system. The final category of emergence is called an undesirable emergent properties (UEPs) 
which are an undesirable and unanticipated emergence. UEP as emergence of a system is 
illustrated in Fig. 3 for A320-200. On September 14, 1993, Lufthansa Flight 2904, Airbus A320-
200, tried to land on the runway at Warsaw International Airport on a bad weather. To overcome 
reported crosswind, the right wing was lowered, resulting in a single wheel landing. For safety, 
the software system was designed not to deploy the thrust reversers and spoilers if weight on both 
wheels and wheel rotation above 72 knots are not detected. Left landing gear did not touch the 
ground for about 9 seconds after the landing. The computer software commanded thrust reversers 
and spoilers not be deployed and as a consequence, the aircraft hit the barrier and crashed. The 
braking subsystem behaved exactly as specified but the system failed. This is an example of a 
system failure. A reliable software system was unsafe. Safety ility requirement was not met.  
It is noted that the function of timekeeping for the hourglass system does not have meaning 
without a user. The emerged function has meaning only to a user or an operator. This brings up an 
important point of the role of an operator in the study of emergence. Emergence in systems makes 
us pay attention to the role of an observer. Then, we ask, if an emergent functionality has meaning 
 
Figure 3. A320 crash showing UEP as an emergence in a system 
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only with an observer, if the emergence exists only in the mind of an observer, does it mean that 
emergence does not have an independent existence? This question about subjective quality of 
emergence has been discussed by several authors. For instance, Crutchfield [17] considered the 
properties of complexity to be subjective qualities determined by the observer. He believed 
defining structure and detecting the emergence of complexity are inherently subjective scientific 
activities. On the other hand, Peter Corning [18] asked, “Must the synergies be perceived/observed 
in order to qualify as emergent effects, as some theorists claim? Most emphatically not. The 
synergies associated with emergence are real and measurable, even if nobody is there to observe 
them.” When we consider the emergence in engineering domain, we acknowledge both qualities 
to be present. In socio-technical systems, we cannot do away with either the role of stakeholders 
or the objective reality of emerged values.  
One of the first remarks of emergence in a historical context was made by Galileo [19]. A 
column of marble was stored on two supports at either end as shown in Fig. 4. The masons knew 
these columns could break under their own weight so they placed another support at mid-section 
of the beam. One of the end supports decayed over time while the middle support has remained 
 
Figure 4. Galileo’s broken marble column for emergent property illustration 
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hard as illustrated in Fig. 4. The half of the beam projected into the air without support. 
Consequently the column broke at the mid-point. Galileo remarked “it is a very remarkable and 
thoroughly unexpected accident, especially if caused by placing that new support in the middle.” 
H. Petroski [20] commented that it is, to this day, considered a model of failure analysis. 
When we conduct a risk analysis which is the main topic of this work, it is required to 
define and understand risk clearly. Risk is defined to be the potential that something will go wrong 
as a result of an event or a series of events. Functionality as emergence of a system is listed in 
Table 1. The corresponding properties as applicable to risk definition are shown in Table 2. The 
undesirable and unanticipated emergence, called UEP (undesirable emergent property), fits the 
definition of risk. The desired and anticipated functionality category also fits the definition of risk 
if the desired functionality does not happen or is degraded [21,22]. Undesirable and anticipated 
functionality could be categorized as risk as well since we have to control and monitor the 
undesirable functionality for opportunity to improve the situation. 
 
    Table 1. Functionality as an emergence property of aircraft 
 Anticipated Unanticipated 
Desirable Function, performance and 
ilities  
Sense of freedom 
Undesirable Electromagnetic effects Anomalies or accidents 
 
Table 2. Risk as an emergent property of aircraft 
 Anticipated Unanticipated 
Desirable Degradation of ilities N/A 
Undesirable EMI with known probability  Potential of failure 
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This categorization provides an ontological flavor to functionality and risk discussion [23]. We 
may sum up the discussion up to this point as follows: 
1. The power of an engineering system is in emergence. 
2. Emergence is manifest by functionality – function, performance, ilities and UEP 
(undesirable emergent property). UEP is an emergence with negative consequences. 
3. Emergence provides values or meaning to an operator or a user or an observer. This 
emphasizes the role of an operator, a user or an observer. 
4. Risk is defined as an emergent property of a system [24]. It is an emergence with a potential 
of negative consequences.  
Above discussion about systems and emergent property of a system is applicable to a general 
system. Since the system in this work is restricted to engineering systems, the following definition 
of systems in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 is useful [25]:  
“[5.2.1] Systems are man-made, created and utilized to provide products or services in 
defined environments for the benefit of users and other stakeholders.”  
Thus an engineering system is a purposeful collection of inter-related components working 
together to achieve a common objective, and it may include software, mechanical, electrical and 
electronic hardware. For engineering systems, people are responsible for its installation and 
operation and systems are procured, owned and operated by organizations.  
In summary, a system is made up of entities that interact or are interrelated, and the 
properties and behavior of system components are inexplicably inter-mingled and form a whole. 
This forming of a whole with interrelated parts generally leads to a complex system. The main 
characteristics of such formed systems are new emergent functionality. A system is greater than, 
or other than, the functions of the individual entities considered separately.  
9 
1.2 System and Perspectives 
A system, being a complex entity, may be viewed from many perspectives. An example of 
systems perspectives is given as follows: a sign of 55 MPH maximum speed on a freeway in Fig. 
5 may be perceived in several different ways. Professor James C. Maxwell would think of an 
electromagnetic theory of colors, and Professor Einstein might start speculating on a special 
relativity theory. A mechanical engineer may perceive the sign from a metallurgical mechanical 
theory for strength of matter. An artist may pay particular attention to the shapes and shades and 
how they impress our senses. A systems engineer may perceive that the speed sign is only a final 
product and note that there were thoughts about the sign initially. It might have been a vague idea, 
based on a need analysis and requirements. The vague idea evolves into conceptual design through 
operational and logical perspectives, considering all the system aspects including city ordinances, 
laws and local government policies to determine whether it is appropriate to the city. Then a detail 
design in physical perspectives emerged, which turned into an actual physical implementation with 
activities such as integration, testing, production, distribution and servicing of the products.  
So among physicists, a mechanical engineer, an artist, and a systems engineer, whose 
approach or perception is right? The answer is it depends on the goal: The systems engineering 
 
Figure 5. A speed limit sign on a freeway system may be viewed from several perspectives  
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approach is the right one for architecting of the engineering product. However, a physicist’s 
perspective is also right if the goal was to investigate the physical property of the sign. Thus a 
system may be viewed from several different perspectives, and some perspectives are more 
appropriate than others depending on the goal of the project under discussion. Views and 
perspectives are as important as the physical system itself if not more. The role of views in the 
context of architectural development cycle is illustrated in Fig. 6, where several views such as 
operational, logical or functional, and physical view are shown over the architectural lifecycle 
[26]. Application of this “perspectives” to engineering systems is discussed next. 
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1.3 System Architecture and Principles 
The importance of views and perspectives in engineering systems is illustrated by 
discussing the systems architecture taxonomy developed by J. M. Borky [27]. A system taxonomy 
is shown in Fig. 7. We first note that architecture may have the following definitions: 
1) In IEEE Std 610,12, architecture is defined as “the organizational structure of a system or 
component [28].” 
2) In the ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765 International Standard, it is defined as “fundamental 
organization of a system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, and 
to the environment, and the principles guiding its design ad evolution … the organizational 
structure of a system and its implementation guidelines [29].” 
3) In [30], authors define architecting as “the process of structuring the components of a 
system, their interrelationships, and their evolution over time.” 
System Taxonomy in Fig. 7 shows three architecture axes [31]. The axis of abstraction indicates 
the levels of system architecture in terms of abstraction that may progress from operational view, 
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to logical/functional view, and to physical view. The axis of organization refers to the degree of 
organizational extent from an enterprise level to a component level. The axis of categories refers 
to the groups of the system identified to have shared characteristics. We are particularly interested 
in the axis of abstraction since it provides the background of translation of system quality attributes 
into requirements at subsystem level. The details of the translation process are discussed fully in 
Chapter 2. System taxonomy helps us to understand the system in a logical way.  
Systems thinking may be done with system architecture principles. Systems thinking is 
thinking about problems explicitly considered as a system. Systems thinking is used for 
understanding behavior of an existing system and for imagining improved system changes. We 
use several principles for system thinking. For engineering systems the following principles in 
Table 3 may be used, which follows the table in [32] with seven added principles. Each principle 
is discussed below. 
1) The principle of emergence: As a system is formed by putting elements together, due to 
interaction between elements, function, behavior, performance, and UEPs emerge. 
2) The principle of holism: Every system is a part of a large system and is a system of smaller 
systems. 
Table 3. Principles of system architecture 
1. Emergence 12. Stress of modern practice 23. Apparent complexity 
2. Holism 13. Architectural decision 24. Hierarchy 
3. Focus 14. Reuse of legacy elements 25. Second law 
4.Perspective 15. Product evolution 26. Decomposition 
5. Dualism 16. Beginning 27. Leadership and management 
6. Coherence 17. Balance 28. 2 Down, 1 up 
7. Benefit delivery 18. System problem statement 29. Elegance 
8. Values and architecture 19. Boundary adjustment 30. Robustness of architecture 
9. Solution neutral function 20. Ambiguity and goals 31. Coupling & organization of 
architectural decision 
10. Role of the architect 21. Creativity 32. Dualism of function  risk 
11. Ambiguity 22. Essential complexity 33. Unpredictability 
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3) The principle of focus: The number of identifiable issues of a system at any point is beyond 
one’s ability to understand. Identify and focus on the most critical and consequential issues. 
4) The principle of Perspective: System architecture may be viewed from many different 
perspectives. All systems are viewed from perspectives for proper understanding. 
5) The principle of dualism: All built systems exist in the physical domain as well as in the 
informational domain. 
6) The principle of coherence: This principle is closely related to the principle of dualism. 
The physical domain and the information domain should be coherent from each other. 
7) The principle of benefit delivery: Good architectures must deliver benefits by focusing on 
the emergence of functions, delivered across the system boundary at an interface. 
8) The principle of value and architecture: Architecture is function enabled by form. Benefit 
is delivered by function, and form is associated with cost. Value is benefit at cost. 
9) The principle of Solution-Neutral Function: Poor system specifications may lead the 
architect to a narrower set of potential options. 
10) The principle of Role of the Architect: To resolve ambiguity, simplify complexity and 
enhance creativity, which are the architect’s role. 
11) The principle of Ambiguity: Great ambiguity characterizes the early phase of a system 
design. The architect strives to resolve this ambiguity and produce, and continuously 
update goals for the team. 
12) The principle of stress of the modern practice: Modern product development processes 
should be employed, which include concurrency, distributed teams, and supplier 
engagement, and having a good architecture. 
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13) The principle of architectural decisions: Architectural decisions must be made carefully. 
It should be done with enough time taken and upfront because of its criticality. 
14) The principle of reuse of legacy elements: Use legacy systems fully. Their emergent 
properties should be studied and selected features are transferred to the new architecture. 
15) The principle of product evolution: Place importance to interfaces, since the architecture 
itself evolves and may lose competitive edges. 
16) The principle of beginning: The stakeholders for both internal and external influence the 
architecture. Their impact should be considered at the beginning. 
17) The principle of balance: Be balanced about numerous factors so the factors that satisfy 
stakeholders are addressed. 
18) The principle of System Problem Statement: The statement of the problem is where the 
architecting starts. The problem statement must be studied fully until we are satisfied. 
19) The principle of boundary adjustment: In order to treat and understand a system properly, 
it is necessary to set up boundaries wisely. 
20) The principle of Ambiguity and Goals: Resolve ambiguity and produce representative and 
consistent goals. The process may go through several cycles. 
21) The principle of creativity: Resolve tensions to produce good architecture and ensure that 
creativity emerges. 
22) The principle of apparent complexity: Keep the apparent complexity within the range of 
human understanding via abstraction and decomposition. 
23) The principle of Essential complexity: Pay attention to functionality which drives and forms 
essential complexity. Choose a concept that produces low grade complexity. 
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24) The principle of hierarchy: All complex systems have hierarchy. Typical hierarchy 
taxonomy is comprised of organization hierarchy and abstraction hierarchy. 
25) The principle of second law: Since the actual complexity of the system exceeds the 
essential complexity, make decisions to reduce the essential complexity to the level of 
essential complexity. 
26) The principle of decomposition: Make active choices for decomposition, which affects 
performance measurement and organization and supplier value capturing. 
27) The principle of leadership and management: System work is done by project management, 
and leadership is an important aspect for project management. 
28) The principle of 2 down, 1 up: Be attentive on the sequence between decomposition at 
Level 1 and the relationships identified at Level 2. 
29) The principle of elegance: Low essential complexity and a decomposition that aligns many 
planes produce elegance in architecting. 
30) The principle of robustness of architecture: Be attentive to the change which affects 
robustness and adaptability. 
31) The principle of coupling and organization of architectural decision: Be sensitive about 
the metrics to the decisions as well as the degree of connectivity of decisions. 
32) The principle of dualism of function and risk: Function and risk emerge together. 
33) The principle of unpredictability: It is difficult to predict emergent properties from physics 
only, even though no physical laws are violated for emergence. 
Among these principles, some of the important principles for the system level risk mitigation work 
are those of focus (No. 3), dualism (No. 5) and coherence (No. 6). We note a complex system may 
be analyzed by dividing it into the physical domain and informational domain (dualism), put 
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certain elements under study (focus) and check the coherence between the physical elements and 
informational elements (coherence). 
While we incorporate systems thinking as discussed above into our system architecture 
consideration, we note that systems thinking has the tendency to cover the object of interest in its 
entirety, which is the principle of holism. Thus there is a need to balance it out with the focused 
(centricity) thinking which helps us to give proper attention to the part or aspect of the system 
under study. This focus is then checked against the background or context for coherence. Thus we 
may propose the following primary actions: action of principle of focus (centricity) and principle 
of coherence [33]. In consideration of system architecture, we recognize the principle of focus 
brings in the limits required for the research, and the principle of coherence brings in the test 
required to ascertain the correctness of the part within the context of the system. Let’s consider an 
example of aircraft system under electromagnetic threats. The electromagnetic threats affect the 
entire aircraft, thus the entire system should be examined in accordance with the holism systems 
thinking principle. However, we may apply the principle of focus to each individual component or 
subsystem to conduct our research into the subsystem or the component. Subsequently, we apply 
the principle of coherence to check if our research of the individual component is in coherency 
with the rest of the system. We can say the line of boundary we draw around the part is not a solid 
line but is a dotted line tentatively distinguishing the part under discussion from the rest of the 
system for convenience. 
The electromagnetic risk analysis work is heavily electromagnetics-oriented. There is a 
tendency for an electromagnetics specialist to fall into a trap of concentrating on the narrow area 
and not seeing the big picture, i.e., seeing trees but not the forest. This defect is corrected by 
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application of these two principles. The view, perspective or the frame is provided for the 
electromagnetics specialists by systems engineers. 
1.4 Conceptual System and Physical System 
We wish to explore the topic of conceptual system in this section. We note that a system 
has the following meaning [34]: 
“An integrated set of elements, sub-systems, or assemblies that accomplish a defined 
objective. These elements include products (hardware, software, and firmware), processes, people, 
information, techniques, facilities, services, and other support elements. A combination of 
interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes.” 
The above definition refers to both physical systems in the real world and a conceptual 
system, a mental representation of the actual system [35]. As such, the systems engineer must 
distinguish between the real world system and the conceptual system. 
It is noted Blanchard and Fabrycky [36] made a clear distinction between a conceptual 
system and a physical system in their general discussion of systems. The importance of this insight 
has not been appropriately emphasized in public literature. From the detailed analysis of the 
abstraction hierarchy, we note how widely spread the conceptual system is in engineering systems 
as well as in systems found in many other areas. The conceptual system exists in the form of 
written and spoken languages, thoughts, electromagnetic transmission in the air, electrical and 
non-electrical signals, and data in communication systems and computers, etc., which are also 
Table 4. Conceptual system and physical system 
  Can concept/information exist without 
physical system? 
  Yes No 
Can physical exist 
without concept? 
Yes Dualism Materialism 
No Idealism Neutral Monism 
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called an information system or a thought system [37,38]. If we allow ourselves to consider deeper 
meaning of two systems and their implication, we find that this question has been explored for a 
long time throughout the western intellectual history. The relationship between a conceptual 
system and a physical system as shown in Table 4 has parallel to mind and matter problem in 
philosophy. A 17th century French philosopher Rene Descartes differentiated matter and mind by 
imagining God’s mind and treating the rest of the world as a world of matter. The distinction was 
made that matter has extension and the mind does not. The mind and matter exist separately and 
they interact in a mysterious way in human mind. Idealists believe all things are imbued with mind, 
and matter can exist only with mind. Materialists believe the opposite that matter can exist by itself 
but mind cannot. Neutral Monists believe all things have mind and matter coexisting as one. We 
note that the dualism we discussed before in the context of the systems thinking principle is 
different from the philosophical dualism in Table 4. We acknowledge the two systems of a 
conceptual system and a physical system exist, but we do not believe a conceptual system may 
exist by itself. Our position is rather close to materialism and the dualism in the engineering 
principle of dualism is rather a working hypothesis for engineering purposes. In engineering 
systems, the conceptual system exists in the form of drawings, diagrams, documents, meeting logs, 
test data, etc. The artifacts may be understood from this system point of view. Initially there was 
a concept of an engineering product (aircraft as an example). That concept grew to have extensive 
ramifications since the concept transforms into to sub-concepts for many parts of the engineering 
product (wings, fuselage, flight control, engine, power, etc.). Each sub-concept generated 
respective drawings. Each drawing produced corresponding part. Integration of the parts produced 
the engineering product (aircraft). In some way this process is similar to the growth of organisms. 
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The hierarchy of abstraction can be best understood fundamentally by considering the 
significance of the conceptual system. Concepts eventually are implemented and materialized in 
the form of a physical system. Lifecycles in systems engineering may be recast as a process of this 
transformation of a conceptual system into a physical system [39]. In a way we may say all written 
and spoken activities in engineering are of a conceptual system because concept formation in such 
activities is a typical way we conduct engineering. We may equally say all activities in engineering 
are of a physical system since for every conceptual system, there is a corresponding physical 
system.  As we discussed before, this aspect of the relation between the two systems may be called 
a principle of duality [40], but it is different from the Cartesian dualism. As commented before, 
we take a position of materialism on this issue that an information domain in the form of concepts, 
design, drawing, past lessons is based on a physical system which is in the form of hardware and 
test equipment. A distinction between the conceptual system and the physical system is possible, 
but we may say they are generally two sides of the same coin. Take an aerospace company as an 
example of a system organized by concepts. We have the concept of the company’s existence and 
structure. This concept of common understanding ties together the enterprise headquarters, 
engineering offices, manufacturing facilities and test labs. What we consider an aerospace 
company is entirely organized by this conceptual system. Without this conceptual system, people 
wouldn’t know what they are supposed to do and how all these facilities as a physical system are 
related to each other. Thus the conceptual system is at the core of the company, and company’s 
changes and evolution are based on the conceptual system. Projects or product development at a 
company start with a conceptual system on an abstract level and then progresses into 
logical/functional and to a physical system eventually. Again we emphasize that the dualism in 
system architecture is different from the dualism in metaphysics developed by the French 
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Philosopher Rene Descartes [41] who advocated demarcation between God’s mind and matter. 
The system architecture is a physical system which is designed, iterated and monitored by the 
engineering mind which is a conceptual system in the informational domain. In engineering, we 
take the position that mind always has the material basis of neurophysiological system and is never 
a separate entity on its own. The separate existence of mind was the position of Rene Descartes 
who placed the mind in God, which was the dominant thinking in the 17th century. We view that 
engineering mind always has a physical basis, thus materialism would be the best description of 
our position.  
The way of interaction between the two is another interesting question with a long history 
in the theory of knowledge or truth. Thus we wish to discuss this principle of dualism for the 
relation between the two systems. The main question is, when we have the conceptual system and 
the physical system, how we ascertain the physical system is correctly materialized per the 
conceptual system and how the conceptual system represents the physical system correctly. This 
question has been treated in the epistemology as a theory of knowledge [42]. According to the 
theory of knowledge, there are three theories on truth: (1) correspondence theory, (2) coherence 
theory, and (3) pragmatist theory. These three theories take different approaches as to what 
constitute the truth and relation between knowledge and reality. In engineering domain, we take 
all three theories to be relevant depending on situations, context and goals. The engineering 
drawings match the engineered artifacts, testing per conceptual system coherently matches the 
outcome in the physical system, and the conceptual system as well as the physical system provide 
practical values. Views are one of the key concepts in systems architecture. The main components 
of the conceptual system are the views or representations. These two systems, conceptual and 
physical, are internally related and one flows to the other in one movement.  
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 The fundamental structures of conceptual system and physical system may be modeled 
with Object Process Methodology (OPM, ISO 19450, 2015) developed by Professor Dori [43]. 
The modeling language was created on the ontological basis and the canonical structures are 
illustrated in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. 
Creation of OPM language is based on an ontological thinking about general existence. It 
recognizes that the universe may be described with objects and processes (thus the name object-
process methodology). This structure is similar to the transformational grammar being subject-
verb-object structure as expounded by Noam Chomsky. The correspondence of subject to 
instrument, verb to processing, and object to operand is apparent. This canonical structure is 
fundamental to all systems and this is perhaps the way our brains operate as well. The canonical 
system model in Fig. 8 shows a form and function relationship. The form belongs to a physical 
system and function belongs to a conceptual system. A form is comprised of entities and their 
 
Figure 8. OPM representation of canonical system architecture 
FormFunction
processingOperand Entities + relationship
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relationships and a function is comprised of processes and operands. Processing works on the 
operands and operands are the targets of the processing. 
This simple yet powerful diagram is an ontological representation of systems. Form is 
comprised of entities and relationship between them. There are three types of processing: creation 
of operand (making), destroying of operand (absorbing) and affecting of operand. Affecting means 
state changes of the operand. The platform for the modeling tool is shown in Fig. 9. It shows that 
OPM can be created in the OPCAT suite and the OPM language is a bimodal language with OPD 
(object process diagram) and OPL (object process language). OPM is appropriate for ontological 
modeling, thus is appropriate when risk analysis is viewed ontologically.  
 
Figure 9. OPCAT suite for EMI energy coupling model 










1.5 System and Risk 
We defined risk as an emergence or degradation of emergent functionality already in the 
previous section. We wish to continue to consider risk in general within the context of systems. 
Risk is defined as a potential that something will go wrong as a result of an event or a series of 
events [44]. To discuss the relationship between risk and issues, let’s consider the burnt circuit in 
Fig. 10. The burnt circuit is an issue since the lavatory control function is disabled because of this 
anomaly. However, before the circuit was burned, the situation was at risk. After the circuit was 
burnt, the circuit for all other airplanes of the same model became at risk. Thus issues and risks 
are closely related in this sense. The scope of risks goes beyond the technical nature and includes 
marketing, sourcing, regulatory and management [45]. In the context of discussing 
electromagnetic effect risks, we are primarily interested in the technical risks. Specifically, to 
 
 
Figure 10. Burnt circuit in lavatory drain control logic represents issues and risk 
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discuss system level risks, we first want to examine the systems architecture. A system architecture 
may be treated from several perspectives: structural perspective, behavioral perspective, service 
perspective and data perspective, which are further elaborated in the architecture methodology 
called the model-based system architecture process (MBSAP) [46]. So we may say risks may 
reside in structural, behavioral, service and data perspectives. When electromagnetic risks or 
threats are examined carefully, we find risks exist in all four perspectives. A direct lightning effect 
that may affect the aircraft fuselage is an example of a structural risk. An indirect lightning or high 
intensity radiated fields (HIRF) affecting aircraft equipment operation is an example of a 
behavioral risk. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) affecting flight control computer data streams 
is an example of data risk. Portable electronic devices (PEDs) introduced into aircraft by 
passengers affecting airborne internet communication services would be an example of service 
risk. A risk is a potential event, expressed by probability values. 
Risks may exist at many different organizational levels and it is necessary to be able to 
address risks at all levels. Wherever we find functions, we also need to talk about risks. This is 
because we have to be prepared for the worst case as engineers. Discussions of risks at system 
level and at subsystem level can be found in Chapter 2. The discussion includes details of how 
non-functional properties such as safety or reliability may be passed down and translated into 
subsystem level requirements such as the probability specification of fuel subsystem explosion 
due to lightning strikes. Electromagnetic risks are high when the electromagnetic energy flow are 
impeded. Risk mitigation techniques such as conductive bonding or grounding enhance the energy 
flow. The details of how electromagnetic and lightning risks are identified, analyzed and mitigated 
are shown in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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1.6 Challenges and Contributions of this Work 
This work deals with the following challenges and offers the contributions below. 
(1) It is noted that there is a lack of systematic, logical, and disciplined approach to the 
electromagnetic environmental effects in aircraft. Systematic evaluation of the 
electromagnetic effects on aircraft equipment is best approached by system level risk 
analysis and we find that adoption of the standard risk modeling as done in this work 
to be the best approach. 
(2) The approach used in industry to evaluate electromagnetic and lightning effects is 
testing in the lab. The test results produce fixed values, which means the 
electromagnetic effects are considered deterministic. As Keith Armstrong strongly 
argued [47,48], the current reliance on “testing” implies this hazard is deterministic. 
However, the risks of electromagnetic and lightning effects (susceptibility) are actually 
probabilistic. The risk analysis in this research sees this susceptibility as 
“probabilistic.” The nature of susceptibility is probabilistic because the threat levels are 
never completely known, and only the range of the threat levels are estimated. It is not 
prudent to always choose the worst case and test the susceptibility at the worst case 
level because if one chooses that route for lightning test, one will always test the 
lightning “direct” effect test with 200 kA. One can’t and one should adjust the level to 
a reasonable level and use the probabilistic approach. Also we note that testing is not a 
deterministic endeavor. Testing in the lab has many implications and it can be done in 
many different ways. We note there are many variations on how to configure the test 
setup geometry as far as the radiating antennas and test articles are concerned. The 
distance, angle and the whole configuration could be subject of discussion. The exact 
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spot which the radiating antenna is pointing at is also a subject of discussion: at 
connectors, or wires, horizontally or vertically. Lab environment should be also 
discussed. Fans may be in operation in the lab, and there could be connections to the 
console outside lab, since test computers in console might generate noises and affect 
the susceptibility test. The point is there are just too many variables in the test and it is 
not practically possible to figure out all the factors in deterministic way. Thus the most 
sensible approach would be the probabilistic approach. The system level risk analysis 
we perform in this work is designed to accomplish this goal. Risk is expressed as a 
probabilistic quantity and this risk analysis work is fundamentally probabilistic. 
(3) Schism exists between the electromagnetics community and the systems engineering 
community. The tendency of EMI/EMC engineers is to investigate the details of 
electromagnetic fields and current distributions at the parts of concern. While this 
investigation at the component level is one of the necessary steps, the ultimate goal of 
assessing and mitigating the electromagnetic risks is to understand their impact at the 
system level. A typical electromagnetics specialist is not well trained in the systems 
engineering, but it is believed that application of systems engineering to 
electromagnetics engineering is an extremely important and valuable activity. There 
may be cultural and historical reasons for the schism between the two disciplines but it 
doesn’t have to be that way. This work is one of the first serious attempts to bridge the 
gap between the two disciplines. The combining of the two disciplines should generate 
synergy that will be proven significantly productive because electromagnetic energy is 
fundamentally propagative and global and so study of its effect on electronic modules 
and systems should be conducted from the systems engineering perspectives.  
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1.7 Chapter Conclusions 
In order to provide increased rigor to the system level risk analysis, we examined the 
definitions of systems and emergence. We have noted that emergence is one of the most important 
characteristics of a system. The categorization of emergence in terms of desirability and 
predictability has been performed. Defining systems with emergent properties led us to the 
definition of risk in a natural way as undesirable emergent properties of systems. The nature of 
risk is discussed within the categorization table of emergence. This ontological approach was 
found to be best served by using the Object Process Methodology (OPM) for modeling purposes. 
OPM modeling is appropriate and applicable to the electromagnetic risk analysis. The OPM 
modeling platform, OPCAT suite, has been introduced. Numerous principles of system 
architecture and systems thinking were given and discussed. In addition to 26 principles found in 
public literature, seven new principles have been newly introduced in our research. The OPM 
modeling language and the discussed principles of systems thinking are used extensively 
throughout this work.  
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2. Translation of System Quality Attributes to Subsystem Requirements 
 
 
As a background for the system level risk analysis, we would like to consider how the 
system level quality attributes may be passed down to subsystem and component level and 
translated into functional requirements. The main quality attribute of this work, safety or risk, is 
considered to be a non-functional property of a system. We already have shown that ilities are 
emergent properties of a system in Chapter 1. Safety is one of the ilities which aircraft customers 
view to be the most important ones. Without aircraft safety ensured, all other values will have very 
little meaning. The safety ility is declared to be the most important value in the FAA value 
statement [49] and aircraft manufacturers and airlines also declare similar value statements. This 
Chapter describes how such quality attributes or ilities may be passed down to subsystems and 
translated into requirements.  
In consideration of the use of ilities for systems engineering of subsystems and 
components, we note prior work on ilities has emphasized or restricted their application to system 
level non-functional properties. The premise of this work is that ilities can be applied with benefit, 
and in some cases of necessity, to lower levels of systems as well. The veracity of this premise is 
established by pointing to an example that demonstrates how safety is passed as a non-functional 
property of electrical and structural subsystems in commercial airliners. It is further demonstrated 
that passing ilities down to the subsystem level is not only a useful practice for systems engineers, 
but it can be an essential step to ensure that customer needs are actually met by the system. Systems 
engineers often lack the detailed knowledge of the subsystems or components required to translate 
ilities into functional requirements. Thus the system ilites are passed down and translated by 
subject matter experts from non-functional to functional requirements. We recast the ilities 
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translation process using expanded SoS architecting with ilities (SAI) method. The relation of the 
ilities translation process to classical system engineering processes is discussed. This chapter paves 
a way to explore the possibility of applying systems engineering principles to electromagnetics 
engineering, filling the gap between the two disciplines. 
2.1 Introduction 
Ilities are a way for systems engineers to capture customer needs early in the system 
lifecycle prior to the development of functional requirements. They are the developmental, 
operational, and support requirements a program must address. Examples are reliability, quality, 
flexibility, safety, durability, manufacturability, and testability as shown in Fig. 11 and Table 5, to 
name a few [50]. They are not specific requirements of the system. Rather, they are properties of 
 





the system that are important to customers and other stakeholders. Each ility may have a variable 
level of importance to each stakeholder and one function of the systems engineer is to work with 
the team chartered with implementing the system to develop a solution that balances all 
stakeholder interests. The ilities are then translated to functional requirements. 
A more restrictive definition of ilities limits them to only system level non-functional 
requirements. For instance, they have been defined as “desired properties of systems, such as 
flexibility or maintainability … these properties are not the primary functional requirements of a 
system’s performance, but typically concern wider system impacts with respect to time and 
stakeholders [51].” On this understanding, ilities are limited to system level descriptions. A similar 
definition of ilities was used in [52] where ilities were restricted to stakeholders’ needs in relation 
to the level of service. In their approach, ilities are used in a quality function deployment (QFD) 
matrix which transforms the qualitative user demands into quantitative parameters. This approach 
provides a valuable tool to systems engineers in managing ilities, but it is applied only at a top 
system level and does not flow ilities to lower parts of the system. 
This same approach of limiting ilities to system level analysis exists in software 
development. For instance, this approach is taken in [53] which uses non-functional requirements 
for software architecting. On their approach, each ility is listed in a table which can be used to 
assess the ability of the architecture to achieve desired system aspects for space mission flight 
Table 5. List of ilities 
 
Quality Reliability Safety Flexibility Robustness
Durability Scalability Adaptability Usability Interoperability
Sustainability Maintainability Testability Modularity Resilience
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software. While this is a valuable tool for software development, the ilities are only applied at the 
system architecting level. 
The central proposal in this work is that for complex systems, ilities can be applied with 
benefits to not only system level properties, but also to subsystems as well. The veracity of this 
premise is established by pointing to an example that demonstrates how safety is passed down as 
a non-functional property to electrical subsystems in commercial airliners. Examples of an 
emergency light subsystem and lightning related subsystems are shown. A secondary point of this 
work is that passing ilities down to subsystem level is not only a useful practice for systems 
engineers, but it can be an essential step to ensure customer needs are actually met by the system. 
This is due to the fact that systems engineers often lack the detailed knowledge of subsystems or 
components required to translate ilities into functional requirements. As a result, for complex 
systems, ilites are passed down so they can be translated by experts from non-functional to 
functional requirements which ensures that customer needs are met. The idea that ilities can be 
used not only at a system level, but also at a subsystem level for complex systems is the central 
focus of this work. 
This work is divided into seven sections. Section 2.2 proposes a working definition of ilities 
which accounts for their use in subsystems and components. Section 2.3 considers the place and 
implication of conceptual system in systems engineering. Section 2.4 provides examples for how 
ilities for complex systems are passed down to subsystem or components in the system. The point 
of this section is to establish the legitimacy of the premise. Section 2.5 describes the expanded SoS 
Architecting with Ilities (SAI) method to be used when ilities are passed down. Section 2.6 
discusses the correlation between translation process and the development process in classical 
systems engineering. Section 2.7 provides a summary and suggestions for additional work 
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2.2 Definition and Scope of Ilities 
The proposed definition of ilities builds upon prior work, but expands it. It includes their 
use in lower levels of systems such as subsystems and components. We don’t propose a 
redefinition of ilities, but rather a redefinition of their scope of use. That ilities describe system 
level properties is not disputed. Users and most stakeholders are concerned about system level 
properties and are much less concerned about the subsystems used to achieve them. 
The contention of this work is that it is incorrect to confuse stakeholder ility concerns with 
how systems engineers and architects use ilities. Instead of ilities being converted from system 
level non-functional requirements to system level function requirements only, they can be passed 
to lower levels in the system for conversion to functional specifications. In other words, just 
because stakeholders view ilities as system level properties they are concerned with does not mean 
that the use of ilities by developers must be restricted to only the system level. Instead, for complex 
systems, ilities can be passed down to lower levels in the system such as subsystems and 
components for conversion to functional requirements. This practice frees up certain restrictions 
existing in ilities engineering and offers significant benefits for paving a way to apply systems 
engineering principles to subsystems and components engineering. In this paper, we apply this 
approach to engineering electromagnetics. Other benefit of the expansion of scope of ilities is that 
it increases the tools available to systems engineers and architects. This is because it allows them 
to perform ilities trade studies not only at the system level, but also at the subsystem level. This 
can be an important benefit since it allows trade studies at the lower levels of the system prior to 
conversion of non-functional properties to functional requirements. 
The translation may be viewed from an architectural hierarchy viewpoint such as of 
abstraction or organizational [54]. It is illustrated in Fig. 12 that translation can be performed either 
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in the hierarchy of abstraction or organization. Typically ilities are considered at the system of 
systems (SOS) or systems level and the translation is performed at a lower level. A similar 
translation may be performed in the hierarchy of abstraction. The ilities are placed at highly 
abstract level such as operational viewpoint and are translated at a less abstract level. Thus the 
translation covers the flow from an operational viewpoint to a functional/logical viewpoint and to 
a physical viewpoint. In this context, consideration of conceptual system provides the key to 
fundamental understanding. 
2.3 Place of a Conceptual System in Systems Engineering 
Blanchard and Fabrycky [55] made a clear distinction between a conceptual system and a 
physical system in their general discussion of systems. The importance of this insight has not been 
appropriately emphasized in public literature. From the detailed analysis of abstraction hierarchy, 
we note how widely spread the conceptual system is in engineering systems as well as in systems 
found in many other areas. The conceptual system exists in the form of written and spoken 
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languages, thoughts, learning, planning, electromagnetic transmission in the air, electrical and non-
electrical signals, data in communication systems and computers, and others [56]. In engineering 
systems, the conceptual system exists in the form of specifications, drawings, diagrams, 
documents, meeting logs, test data, procedures, reports, and others. The hierarchy of abstraction 
can be best understood fundamentally by considering the significance of the conceptual system. 
Concepts eventually are implemented and materialized in the form of a physical system.  
Lifecycles in systems engineering [57] may be recast as a process of this transformation of 
a conceptual system into a physical system. The hierarchy of abstraction can also be recast from 
this point of view [58]. In a way, we may say all written and spoken activities in engineering are 
of a conceptual system because concept formation in such activities is a typical way we conduct 
engineering activities. We may equally say all activities in engineering are of a physical system 
since for every conceptual system, there is a corresponding physical element or system.  This 
aspect of the relation between the two systems is called a principle of dualism [59]. A distinction 
between conceptual system and physical system is possible, but we may say they are generally two 
sides of the same coin. Take an aerospace company as an example of a system organized by 
concepts. We have the concept of the company’s existence and structure. This concept of common 
understanding ties together the enterprise headquarters, engineering offices, manufacturing 
facilities and test labs. What we consider an aerospace company is entirely organized by this 
conceptual system. Without this conceptual system, people wouldn’t know what they are supposed 
to do and how all these facilities as a physical system are related to each other. Thus the conceptual 
system is at the core of the company and changes and evolution are based on the conceptual system. 
Projects or product development at a company start with a conceptual system on an abstract level 
and then progresses into logical/functional and to a physical system eventually.  
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2.4 Ilities Translation in Aircraft Electromagnetic Environment 
In Section 2.1, we proposed the idea that ilities can be applied with benefit to not only 
system level properties, but also to subsystems as well with proper translation. In this section, we 
intend to describe an example of how the ilitiy of safety is passed down to the electrical subsystem 
of a commercial airliner. Specifically, the electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) will be used 
as an example [60,61]. Safety as a top level system ility comes from stakeholders such as the FAA, 
the EASA, aircraft manufacturers, and airliners. We note that safety is a primary issue in aircraft 
operation as the following value statement of the FAA attests:  
“Our continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the 
world … Safety is our passion. We work so all air and space travelers arrive safely at their 
destinations [62].” (FAA Value Statement 2015)  
This is a major motivating factor for every policy and regulation decision made by the 
FAA. This emphasis on safety is also shared by the manufacturers of commercial airliners. For 
instance, the vision statement of Boeing emphasizes:  
“We value human life and health above all else and take action accordingly to maintain the 
safety of our workplaces, products and services.” [63].  
Airliners also understand that the future of their company depends upon producing 
products that maintain the safety of their airliners. Based on these considerations, Safety is 
introduced to aviation industry as one of the most critical ilities that cover the system level needs. 
We propose the translation of the system level ilitiy of safety into the requirements at the 
subsystems level be done for various environmental threats to aircraft [64]. Safety as an ility is a 
non-functional system property which stakeholders understand is critical to customer needs. 
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Firstly, safety is passed down from the system to the subsystem. Subsequently, the subsystem 
experts translate the requirement of safety into functional requirements. 
Consider, for instance, how safety is applied to electromagnetic environmental threats on 
aircraft. The aircraft subsystem engineer will apply a context diagram for threat environment 
categories. It is shown in Fig. 13 which describes the electromagnetic environment of aircraft such 
as lightning, HIRF, PEDs, P-static and EMI/EMC. [65] 
· Lightning: These are lighting strikes on the aircraft body during flight or while on the 
ground [66]. 
· HIRF: These are High Intensity Radiated Fields from sources such as radar systems, radio 
transmitting towers, to name a few [67,68]. 
· PEDs: These are Portable Electronic Devices such as mobile phones, lap tops, and tablets 
which can radiate electromagnetic energy when taken onboard an aircraft [69, 70]. 
· P-Static: This is Precipitation Static caused by friction between air particles and the surface 
of aircraft. 
· EMI/EMC: These are electromagnetic interference and compatibility among electrical and 
electronic equipment. 
 
Figure 13. Aircraft electromagnetic context diagram 
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These electromagnetic effects are directly related to safety of aircraft and they may be 
effectively used in discussing the level of effects in aircraft. Safety value is absorbed by the 
subsystem experts and used as a guide for decisions, specifications, and processes. The subsystem 
engineer will consider the recipients of these electromagnetic threats in an aircraft as shown in Fig, 
9 and translate the system level safety concerns into subsystem or component level consideration. 
Translation requires specific knowledge of the subsystems that can be affected by electromagnetic 
threats. 
This process of translation occurs when the subsystem and component experts develop 
testing methods, requirements, and qualification processes. The goal of safety is not quantified; it 
is a non-functional system property which the experts understand is critical to customer needs. 
Therefore, safety ility becomes a guide standard. 
Next we wish to review the translation process in detail. Lightning strike attachments 
generate both direct and indirect hazardous effects to aircraft safety. Lightning direct effect events 
are as follows [71,72]. 
(1) Lightning direct effects: 
a. Melt-through damage for metal or non-metal skins (of fuel tank skin, trailing edge, 
painted skin, and radome). 
b. Resistive heating damage (bonding strap heating or exploding wires for a navigation 
light on a plastic vertical fin cap, diverter straps, pitot probe air tube, and radome) 
Magnetic force effects (slamming together of two metal air pressure tubes in a radome 
mounted pitot system, in wing tip trailing edges, bent bond straps). 
c. Arcing across bonds (over riveted joints with corrosion inhibiting coating, over 
fasteners or bonding jumpers with inadequate current carrying capacity, over fasteners 
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in secondary structures such as wing tips, tail cones, wheel well doors, and flight 
control surfaces, over adhesive bonds, over hinges and bearings resulting in pitting or 
welding). 
d. Sparking over structural joints. 
e. Punctures or flash-over over nonconductive composite material (radomes, composite 
material skin). 
f. Damage of windshields, canopies, windows (direct or swept channel attachment to 
heating elements and damaging the connected power circuits). 
g. Damages on electrically conductive composites (carbon fiber composite skins in Zone 
1 and 2 by lightning stroke currents by mechanism of pyrolysis and shock wave; 
primary structures, engine nacelle and pylon, flight control surface, leading edge 
devices, avionics bay, wing and empennage tips, fuel tank skin). 
h. Damage of propulsion system (engine cowlings or nacelles, propeller and rotor blades, 
gear boxes damaged by lightning attachments).  
i. Rain erosion of conductive lightning protection strip (degradation of conductive frame 
on wings and empennage). 
(2) Lightning indirect effect events for which the following systems of concern fail: 
a. Full authority digital engine control (FADEC). 
b. Full authority electronic flight control (Fly-by-wire). 
c. Supervisory control systems capable of initiating control inputs that could endanger 
flight safety. 
d. Fully or highly integrated cockpit instruments and displays. 
e. Electronic flight instrumentation system (EFIS). 
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f. Aircraft electric power control and distribution system. 
g. Electrical and avionics systems that include externally mounted apparatus, such as air 
data probes, heaters, actuators, and antennas. 
(3) Fuel tank ignition or fire due to lightning strikes. 
As we examine the lightning threats in aircraft, we note specific components must be included in 
resolving the issues. In other words, discussions of the damage and effects due to lightning strikes 
encompass the system level safety concerns as well as the subsystem and component level 
inspection of the damages and risk resolution. This process is applicable to many safety/risk 
situations. Table 6 illustrates subsystems for the example and corresponding subsystem 
parameters. Thus we may say the safety as an ility is introduced at a system of systems (SoS) or 
systems level. When this ility is passed down to the fuel subsystem level, fuel subsystem engineers 
or subject matter experts examine the safety parameters of the subsystem such as fuel tank 
explosion probability and develop specific requirements such as fuel tank explosion probability 
Table 6. Translated ilities at subsystem level for lightning effects 
DLE: direct lightning effects 
ILE: indirect lightning effects 







Safety Safety Fuselage (DLE) Melt-through damage 
Safety Safety Navigation Light /Pitot tube (DLE) Resistive heating damage 
Safety Safety Wing tip/Tail cone (DLE) Arcing across bonds 
Safety Safety Structural joints (DLE) Sparking 
Safety Safety Radome (DLE) Puncture 
Safety Safety Windshield, canopy, window (DLE) Mechanical damage 
Safety Safety Composite (DLE) Damage 
Safety Safety Propulsion system (DLE) Mechanical and thermal damage 
Safety Safety Conductive strip on rudder (DLE) Rain erosion 
Safety Safety Full authority digital engine control (DLE) Anomaly in engine control 
Safety Safety Full authority electronic flight control (DLE) Flight control error 
Safety Safety Supervisory control systems (DLE) Erroneous control 
Safety Safety Fully or highly integrated cockpit instruments and displays 
(ILE) 
Flickering in display 
Safety Safety Electronic flight instrumentation system (ILE) Error with instrumentation 
Safety Safety Aircraft electric power control and distribution system (ILE) Unpredictable Power shedding 
Safety Safety Electrical and avionic systems (ILE) Air data malfunction 
Safety Safety Fuel Tank (FTI) Tank Flammability 
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requirement of 10E-9 per flight hour. Fuel tank component engineers conduct researches into 
components such as fuel tank gaskets and might develop new design of components. Role of the 
Systems Engineer after Ilities are Passed Down The systems engineer and system architect can use 
ilities at the system or lower levels to perform trade studies to optimize value delivery to users and 
other stakeholders. In addition, once ilities are passed down to subsystem or component 
developers, the role of the systems engineer is to ensure that the correct emphasis is placed on 
ilities during the translation to models and functional requirements [73].  In other words, if the 
ilities are properly managed, then stakeholder needs prioritize the ilities and the role of the systems 
engineer is to ensure continuity of the priorities. As a result, the system engineer must be involved 
in the process of translating the ilities to subsystem or component functional requirements. 
There are several methods to use ilities for conceptual design. One approach useful for 
systems of systems is called the expanded system of system architecting with ilities (SAI) method 
which is an expanded version of the published SAI method [74]. Another method uses non-
functional requirements and quality function deployment (QFD) matrix to rank each of the ilities 
[75].  For our analysis here, we have focused on the expanded SAI method which is established 
 










for system of systems. The extended SAI method is illustrated in Fig. 14. The SAI method covers 
the concept development and the extended portion covers the engineering development. As a 
whole the extended SAI method addresses the concept development and the engineering 
development and it is correspondent to the translation of the system level quality attributes to the 
subsystem level parameters or the requirements. The advantage of having the translation process 
correspond to the SAI method is that the powerful SAI techniques become available by having this 
correspondence. Thus the ility translation process can have the strong foundation and the tools 
within the SAI method become available for the process. This argument can also be used for 
correspondence to the traditional systems engineering with similar benefits.. 
The 12 steps of the extended SAI method in Fig. 15 are elaborated below. 
 






























(1) In this first step, we wish to explore constraints and value proposition: this involves 
identification, understanding, and capturing of the overall value proposition for the SoS 
architecture. The interactions with key stakeholders and their needs are identified, and 
design constraints are also noted. 
(2) Potential perturbations are studied and identified: using various techniques, potential 
perturbations in the context and needs of system that can possibly interfere with SoS value 
registry are identified and listed. 
(3) Initial desired ilities are studied: list ilities that promote the desired long-term behavior of 
the SoS using a variety of analytical tools (e.g., ilities hierarchies, semantic basis tool, and 
others). Note information about relevant perturbations can lead to high interest in certain 
ilities over other ilities. 
(4) Initial architecture alternatives are set up: the purpose of this step is to suggest various 
value-driven architecture for the value proposed in step 1. SoS architecture alternatives in 
terms of operational and design variables, with associated concepts of operations. 
(5) Illity-driving options are produced: this step is concerned with selection and generation of 
options to include in the initial architecture that will eventually result in enabling desired 
ilities (identified in step 3). These options form the linkage to the emergence of lifecycle 
properties over time, because they are the change enablers or resistance to change in the 
SoS when exogenous perturbations threaten SoS value delivery, or when opportunities to 
enhance value delivery arise. Options can also be latent in a given architecture. 
(6) Potential alternatives are evaluated: a model is built and executed to evaluate different SoS 
architecture alternatives in terms of various metrics, including performance (i.e. attributes 
and costs) and illity metrics. 
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(7) Analyze architecture alternatives: the analysis in this step is aimed at developing insight 
and understanding in the trade-offs between static value and ility behaviors within various 
SoS architectures in terms of design and operations choices. Various analytical techniques 
– such as Multi-Epoch Analysis, Era Analysis, and the Valuation Approach for Strategic 
Changeability (VASC) – are employed in this step. 
(8) Trade-off and select “best” architecture with ilities: in the final step, selection criteria for 
nominating the “best” architecture with ilities are justified and documented, and ilities 
requirements are generated.  
(9) Translation into subsystem requirements: The system level quality attributes are passed 
down and translated at the subsystem level and subsystem architecture. This step can 
proceed linearly or iteratively. In this step, the systems engineers examine the desired ilities 
at the subsystem level. Several or many ilities may be considered at this step depending on 
the value register. Thus certain judgment and intimate familiarity of the choices made 
during previous steps are needed. 
(10) Development of functional and logical requirements based on ilities: The subsystem 
experts convert the passed down ilties into functional and logical requirements. 
(11)  Physical viewpoint implementation: actual realization of an increment of capabilities. 
(12) Validation of achievement of the passed down ility: the subsystem engineers perform 
requirement analysis and characterization against the physical implementation, which 
validate the subsystems achieve the requirements from the system level desired ility. 
These steps comprise the complete procedure from SoS architecting to translation of ilities to 
subsystem requirements and provides insight on risk analysis as well.    
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Table 7 provides an example of identifying desired ilities. We may consider three ilities as 
following: safety, quality and reliability. FAA might be interested in safety ility for emergency 
lights on a galley closet. The quality ility may lead to drawing packages of 12 emergency lights as 
shown in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. However, the four lights in aft location may not be required for the 
purpose of safety. It is possible airlines may dispatch aircraft without the aft lights. Also the lights 
may be analyzed with reliability ility. Thus we could see the roles played by trade-off of several 
ilities and the summary of ilities trade-off is shown in Table 7. 
 
Figure 16. Emergency lights for the galley closet 
The outer floor emergency 
lights on closet door 1 
center right operational 
Up
The inner floor 
emergency lights on 
closet door 1 center right 
non-operational 
Outboard
Table 7. Ilities trade-off for emergency light subsystem 
 
Ility Value Lights
Safety Certification 8 lights
Quality Customer Need 12 lights
Reliability Airline Maintenance No defect, long lasting
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2.5 Ilities Translation in the Context of Classical Systems Engineering Processes 
We note this translation of the system level ilities to subsystem level requirements has 
strong correlation to traditional systems engineering processes [76]. This is an important point 
because the similarity allows the tools available in systems engineering to be utilized for the 
processes of ilities translation. We examine the similarity in detail in this section. Typical systems 
engineering processes are shown in Fig. 18 and Fig. 19. The flow of rectangular blocks in Fig. 18 
indicates the typical systems engineering lifecycle of requirements analysis, functional definition, 
physical definition, and design validation. In the system development process, this lifecycle is 
repeatedly used for needs analysis phase, concept exploration phase, concept definition phase, 
advanced development phase, and engineering design phase during concept development stage as 
well as engineering development stage. Thus Fig. 18 is the details of the spiral cycle of Fig. 19 and 
the two figures should be read in tandem.  
 
Figure 17. Wiring diagram of emergency floor proximity light system 
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The systems engineering method is an application of the scientific method in an organized 
and systematic way to develop and architect complex systems. The flow diagram in Fig. 18 starts 
with inputs from the previous phase. Predecessor system, functional building blocks, and previous 
analysis are shown as inputs to the blocks. The inputs to the needs analysis, synthesis of functions 
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are indicated. Also shown are inputs from systems engineering methodology such as partitioning 
criteria, trade-off criteria, measures of effectiveness, and tools and methodologies. 
Representations of key processes are shown as circles in side each block. Information flow, 
feedbacks and iteration are shown with arrows.  
The steps 1 to 8 in extended SAI process includes the needs analysis and requirements 
analysis in the systems engineering method flow diagram. Passing down the ilities and translation 
of ilities into subsystem requirements are performed during the flow from requirement analysis to 
functional definition.  
Passing down the requirements from subsystem level to component level for steps 9 to 12 
corresponds to systems engineering method flow from functional definition to physical definition. 
During the design validation phase, the component level requirements from ilities translation are 
validated and verified. 
 
Figure 19. Axes of abstraction and organization in the systems engineering lifecycle 
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The needs analysis and requirements analysis are necessary to increase the understanding 
of the problem situation and to scope any expansion or corrections needed. In the initial stage of a 
system development process, ideas are in flux and many assumptions are made and ilities are the 
main topic to be discussed. This discussion is important for providing the backdrop for considering 
operational needs and technological opportunities and to flow the high level requirements from 
ilities to increasingly specific representations of requirements and system design. Frequently at 
this stage, the system models, which identifies and describes all design choices, are studied with 
consideration of ilities. 
Functional definition block refers to functional analysis and allocation and is needed to 
ensure a disciplined approach to an effective configuration of the functions and selection of 
implementation that best balances the desired characteristics of system such as performance and 
cost. This block corresponds to translation of the system level architecture into subsystem 
architecture and the development of functional requirements block. The basic building block is a 
subsystem that performs a single significant function with single set of signals, data, energy or 
material. A subsystem is consisted of elements that perform lower level functions which 
aggregates into a subsystem function. After the component level requirements are implemented, 
the design validation is performed, which corresponds to validation of designed architecture for 
the passed down ilities. In development of a complex system, the steps of the design definition 
may have been accomplished in full compliance with requirements. However, the validation step 
is still needed for an explicit validation of the design before moving to the next phase. It is our 
experience that there are too many opportunities for undetected errors without explicit validation, 
verification and evaluation. Such validation includes modeling of the system environment, and 
tests and test data analysis. 
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2.6 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter we have shown that the non-functional requirements typically manifest as 
ilties can be and should be translated into functional requirements at the subsystems and 
components level. In order to achieve this goal, we expanded the SoS architecting with ilities (SAI) 
method, where steps that aid the concrete and specific engineering development at the subsystem 
and component level are incorporated. An example of translation of the safety ility into subsystem 
level parametric development was discussed to demonstrate the value of this approach. 
Electromagnetic environmental threats and lightning effects in aircraft systems were discussed. 
The ilities translation process was discussed in the context of architectural hierarchy. Importance 
of the conceptual system needed for fundamental understanding of architectural processes was 
emphasized. Ilities translation was discussed from the viewpoint of classical systems engineering 
processes. Our approach in this paper follows this tradition and translates the ilities research into 




3. Risk Analysis Model Development 
 
 
The risk analysis and mitigation is approached from a project management point of view. 
We define the risk and risk management project formally in this chapter. The risk is expressed in 
mathematical terms. Then the charter, scope and methodology of the project are presented [77]. 
3.1 Mathematical Expression of Risk 
Risk is generally related to the probability of a hazardous event and the severity of the 
event. As such we may express risk as a set of two elements [78]: 
𝑅𝑖 = {𝐶𝑖, 𝑝(𝐶𝑖)},       𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁        (1) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑖 = Risk of the ith hazardous event, 
𝐶𝑖 = Severity of the event (consequence) 
𝑝(𝐶𝑖) = Probability of consequence 
𝑖 = Event index 
𝑁 = Maximum number of events 
If there are multiple of events to be considered, the final risk is the summation of each risk. 
𝑅 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖, 𝑝(𝐶𝑖),      𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1         (2) 
Consequences are defined as the overall results of a hazardous event. Typically the 
consequence is expressed by financial loss or impact of the event on the overall functionality of 
the system under consideration. A typical way to describe this impact in electromagnetic 
environment is to classify the impact from criticality point of view as follows: 
(1) No effect or no consequence (undisturbed) 
(2) Interference (limited) 
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(3) Degradation (severe) 
(4) Loss of main function/mission kill (very severe) 
(5) Loss of system (catastrophically) 
The electromagnetic environment and the effects depend on the parameters of the source, 
the set up, and the course of action during the event. The event scenario is defined as a set of 
parameters as follows: 
𝑆 = {𝐶𝑠, 𝐿𝑠, 𝐷}.          (3) 
Where: 
𝑆 = The scenario 
𝐶𝑠 = Category of the source 
𝐿𝑠 = Location of the electromagnetic source 
𝐷 = Duration of the scenario 
It is customary in the standard risk model to separate the probability of a consequence into 
the likelihood of the event and the conditional probability of the consequence given the event 
occurrence as follows: 
𝑝(𝐶𝑖) =  𝑝(𝑆𝑘) ∙  𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝑆𝑘).         (4) 
Where: 
𝑝(𝑆𝑘) = Likelihood of the scenario 𝑆𝑘 
𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝑆𝑘) = Conditional probability of 𝐶𝑖 given 𝑆𝑘 
If there are multiple scenarios leading to the same consequence, then (4) may be extended 
to (5): 
𝑝(𝐶𝑖) = ∑  𝑝(𝑆𝑘) ∙  𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝑆𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1 .        (5) 
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 It is also noted that As long as risk is related to uncertainty, risk may also be equated to a 
variance of probability distribution. Our treatment of risk implies risk is logical operation AND of 
risk event probability and risk consequence scale. In some literature it is expressed as logical 
operation OR. Generally AND gate is used and that is the convention we adopt in our work. 
3.2 Charter and Scope of Risk Management Project 
3.2.1 Charter of the project 
For our project, the charter would be to investigate the risk management of electromagnetic 
environmental threats to aircraft with an integrated approach based on the long history of safety 
study of aircraft by employing the latest systems engineering methodology. This research task is 
urgent and strongly motivated by the fact that the electromagnetic environmental effects on aircraft 
have been exacerbated in recent years due to modern aircraft’s increasing dependence on electronic 
devices for communication, navigation and flight control, and growing use of composite materials 
for airframes. The approach includes the management approach and technical approach, and the 
constraints include time constraints, budget constraints, and safety regulations. 
3.2.2 Scope of the project 
The scope of the project includes overview and purpose being the innovative method and 
techniques for system level risk management of electromagnetic environmental threats to aircraft 
and the following items:  
· Methodology of Risk Mitigation technique 
· Concrete examples of how the risks are mitigated in the area of electromagnetic threats and 
lightning threats 
· Test procedures for the technology and methodology 
· Test results for the validation of the approach 
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· Analysis tools such as computerized fault tree analysis which demonstrates the innovative 
technology 
· A final report that summarizes the details of the risk mitigation technology 
 The principles in Table 8 may be used in risk study. The project scope also covers the schedule, 
milestones, project approach, and management of issues, changes, communication, procurement, 
resource, outstanding issues, approvals, deliverables, quality objectives, and quality control 
activities. Although not all of these items are applicable to the current project, it is important to 
understand all aspects of project management since engineering projects typically emerges in 
response to customer needs and management is essential part of the engineering projects. These 
principles are selected from the system architecture principles discussed in Chapter 1. These 
principles are adapted for electromagnetic risk analysis which is discussed in the next chapter. The 
principle of emergence is used for affirmation that risk has the ontological basis by being 
degradation of emergent behavior. The principle of holism is especially adequate for E3 risk 
analysis due to its global nature. The principle of dualism lets us be attentive to the relation between 
Table 8. Principles used for risk analysis 
 
Principle Utility for this work Note
Emergence Risk characterization Risk considered as emergent property  
Holism System perspective Electromagnetic issues are at systems 
level
Dualism Information domain 
and physical domain
Risk mitigation information should be 
represented by physical form
Focus Identify high risk events Focus on high criticality or expected 
loss 
Coherence Criteria of validation 
and verification
Testing, analysis, or simulation to 
check coherence
Dualism of F/R Understanding nature 
of risk
Function and risk on equal footing
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conceptual analysis and physical phenomenon. The principles of focus and .coherence are used for 
conducting the work for risk mitigation. 
3.3 Identification of Risks 
In Figure 20 below, risk management steps are shown. The first step is the identification 
of risks. A list of possible on the register are noted and analyzed [79]. The requirements and scope 
for the project are listed and if these change, opportunity may increase. Deliverables and activities 
in the work breakdown structure (WBS) may be analyzed for potential risks so that comprehensive 
risk analysis can be performed. Project resources may also be analyzed. Other areas that could be 
analyzed include cost, availability, delivery, quality, and expertise for risk identification.  
Costs and budgets deserve attention for potential risks to add to risk register. The risk level 

















identifying potential risks. Communications planning, procurement and managing of project 
including cost, duration and resources also need to be analyzed.  
3.4 Qualitative Risk Analysis 
Qualitative risk analysis is performed after the identification of the risks. This activity 
includes assessment of the probability and impact of each risk on the risk register list. As discussed 
in the previous section, risk probability contains the element of likelihood of the event and the 
element of consequences to the project in terms of cost or time. This process could be subjective 
but one has to do the best one can to attach certain numbers to the likelihood and the consequences. 
The qualitative criticality can be assessed based on Table 9. 
The likelihood and consequence of each risk may be determined through discussions by 
the stakeholders and unbiased subject matter experts or risk analysts. Then, a risk score is 
calculated by multiplying the likelihood by the consequences to derive a risk score. Then the 
ranking can be derived from the risk scores. Modern risk management science does not always 
treat the risks negatively. Some of the risks may be treated as opportunities and so certain 
discretion is required. Then the goal is to maximize the opportunities or the positive risks and 
minimize the threats or the negative risks. After the risk analysis has been completed, we give 
attention to the risks in the upper portions of the risk list. Risk management planning includes 
determination of the threshold above which one has to manage the risks. 
Table 9. Risk event criticality level 
Criticality (Total Loss) 
Level 
Description 
1 No effect or no consequence (undisturbed) 
2 Interference (limited) 
3 Degradation (severe) 
4 Loss of main function/mission kill (very severe) 
5 Loss of system (catastrophically) 
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3.5 Quantitative analysis 
This step requires special attention since it is difficult to perform quantitative analysis. One 
wishes to determine the expected loss of each high-priority risk. From this analysis, we can 
anticipate the cost of the risk in terms of lost or saved time or money. We usually perform 
quantitative risk analysis on the risks which are located above the threshold on the risk list. We 
engage subject matter experts to perform this quantitative analysis. For the expected loss, use the 
formula listed below.  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 
The value of the total loss is what is expected for the loss, or gain if a particular risk event occurs. 
The probability is the likelihood for the event to occur and risk assessment is conducted as shown 
in Fig. 21. 
Expected loss may be added to contingency reserve. By doing similar calculations for each 
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reserve. Similar calculations work for time, allowing one to add contingencies to the schedule. 
Other techniques for quantitative risk analysis include using Monte Carlo analysis, standard 
deviations or distribution charts. Resorting the list may be conducted for the expected loss 
3.6 Risk Mitigation 
Following the approach planning for handling risk, potential risks identification, and 
performed qualitative and quantitative risk analysis performance, one devise a method for risk 
management, one plans for risk evaluation for each of these top ranked risks as shown in Fig. 22 
and the risk resolution steps are shown in Fig. 23. The two figures are showing the same steps but 
the focus for each diagram is different. The first step is to evaluate the risk, which means the 
probability of the events and probability of the impacts should be calculated or estimated. The risk 
mitigation is to resolving the risk with prevention of risk event or planning contingency plans for 
the impact. In other words the risks are resolved actively with scientific methods. The four general 
strategies in PMBOK® are shown in Table 10: 
 
Figure 22. Risk resolution flow diagram for risk level evaluation 
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The strategy depends, in part, upon organization’s culture. Risk resolution strategies 
include the expected loss of the risk, subject matter experts’ opinions and the timing of the potential 
risk. The chosen strategy help determine the specific mitigation plan for each of the top-ranked 
risks. It is important to have a contingency plan (plan A) and a fallback plan (plan B) for the highest 
ranked risks. Budget and schedule should be considered for the mitigation activities. It is important 
to know the time when the risk might happen and to have the responsible personnel for the risks. 
Table 10. Risk resolution strategy for negative and positive risks (PMBOK®) 












Figure 23. Risk resolution flow diagram for risk mitigation 
Risk Resolution












Based on these risk analysis discussions, the overall flow diagrams are developed. The 
flow diagram in Fig. 24 shows that the work starts when there are customer requests or challenges 
that need to be addressed. This is similar to the customer needs in systems engineering  
The requests or needs are examined against the backdrop of understanding of the nature of 
the risks, systems architecture, risk analysis, or the electromagnetic coupling diagrams. Then the 
problem is sent over to the standard risk model. This is shown in Fig. 25, where the standard risk 
model is elaborated. When the standard risk model is carefully analyzed, we obtain the following 
insights:  
(1) The standard risk model shows the causality relation between event drivers and event, 
impact drivers and impact, and the event and the impact,  
(2) The standard risk model shows the event may occur at a system level or at a component 
level, but the impact generally occurs at a system level. 
 
 






























• Research into nature of risks as related to 
emergence property of systems 
• Application of EMI diagram into E3/L with OPM
• ESAI (Extended System of Systems Architecting 
with Ilities)
• Architecture Hierarchy of Abstraction and 
Organization
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(3)  The standard risk model shows the risk event prevention is possible by examining the 
event drivers. Likewise, the impact contingency is possible by carefully examining the 
impact drivers. This process is similar to the root cause analysis and the corrective action 
activity. 
(4) The standard risk model shows two factors are needed for risk analysis: likelihood and total 
loss. Likelihood represents the total probability of the event and the total loss represents 
the criticality of the event. 
Once these insights were obtained by examining the standard risk model, they led to the 
development of the risk analysis and mitigation methodology in Fig. 24 and Fig. 25. In other words, 
when the implication within the standard risk model was unfolded, the meaning became manifest 
as the risk analysis and mitigation flow diagram. Thus this is an example of how a model leads to 
another model. As the challenges or the customer requests are understood in the context of 
architecture, systems engineering, and risk analysis, the problem is given to and analyzed by the 
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standard risk model. It is noted the principles of holism, focus, and dualism in discussed in Chapter 
1 are employed at this stage. 
3.7 Monitoring and Controlling Risks 
In order to deal with many changes such as scope, cost, and time, resources, management, 
project teams, one monitors and controls the risks. There is correlation between the monitoring 
and controlling processes since as changes occur to the project, changes occur to the risks. Changes 
may add additional risks. Monitoring and controlling involve tracking the risks, evaluating the 
effect of the implemented risk mitigations, identifying new risks, and changing the rankings as 
needed. Monitoring and controlling risk includes reserve analysis for the amount of time and 
money, and comparing them to the remaining risks. 
3.8 Risk Management Process Documents 
The risk management processes call for excellent documentation. For example, documents 
such as technical documents, assumptions log updates, and recommended corrective and 
preventative actions are to be written and preserved. Also the project management plan requires 
the documents shown in Table 11 below: 
Table 11. Documents for project management plan 
Project management plan document Need for the document 
Product quality management plan Standards for the product quality  
Expenses management plan Expenses for the project managed 
Scheduling management plan Time aspect of the project  
Team staffing management plan Member recruitment and organization 
Supplier management plan Supplier and procurement management 
Work breakdown structure plan Structure of work activities organized 
Baseline plan for schedule and expense Baseline requirements to establish 
 
The project management processes requires that changes for one aspect affect other 
components of the project. Changes in certain risks may affect other risks as well. Thus risk 
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monitoring is an important aspect of risk management. Documenting plays a critical part in 
managing the changes in risk levels. 
3.9 Chapter Conclusions 
We have defined the risk in mathematical terms in this chapter. Risks were discussed from 
the project management point of view. Systems engineering approach means dealing with all 
aspects of risk management. It is critical to understand risk management requires integrated 
systems approach. By going through the risk analysis steps from identification of risks, the risk 
analysis, prioritization and mapping of risks, resolving the risks, and finally, monitoring of risks, 
risk analysis modeling flow diagram emerged. This flow diagram is the result of having insights 
from the standard risk model. Thus this is an example of one model being unfolded from internal 
structure enfolded in another model. The implication was in the standard risk model and that 
implication was unfolded into the risk modeling flow diagram. Another way of describing this is 
that the new flow diagram emerged from the standard risk model. Emergence and unfolding are 
two aspects of the same phenomenon. 
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4. Risk Analysis of Electromagnetic Environmental Effects in Aircraft 
 
 
Risk Analysis of electromagnetic environmental effects in aircraft systems is performed in 
this chapter. The system level consideration of electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) in 
aircraft is one of the major concerns to aviation industry. Discussion of hazardous electromagnetic 
environmental effects in aircraft systems includes lightning, high intensity radiated fields (HIRF), 
precipitation-static (P-static), portable electronic devices (PEDs), and electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMC) issues, and canonical structure of electromagnetic energy coupling shown in 
Fig. 26 is developed in this chapter for discussions. This model is based on the three-component 
modeling in EMC discipline [80], but the actual modeling is accomplished by using Object Process 
Methodology (OPM) modeling language. The electromagnetic environmental effects on aircraft 
have been exacerbated in recent years due to modern aircraft’s increasing dependence on electronic 
devices for communication, navigation and flight control, and growing use of composite materials 
for airframe. In this chapter, we review electromagnetic environmental effects in aircraft from a 
systems engineering perspective. Considering the complex, interrelated, and dynamic nature of 
electromagnetic phenomenon in aircraft, we find the systems engineering application to 
electromagnetic effects discussion appropriate and beneficial. In particular, we judge that risk 
 
 
Figure 26. Basic electromagnetic energy coupling diagram with OPM  
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analysis methodology is an underutilized but well-suited tool for understanding and mitigation of 
electromagnetic hazardous effects in aircraft systems.  
Herein we first introduce the Standard Risk Model (SRM), and then apply the model to 
electromagnetic risk events and impacts, and follow through with illustrative prioritized 
identifications. We next develop drivers for each risk event and impact, and finally we present the 
baseline risk prevention plans and associated impact contingency plans. We conclude with a 
summary of our findings and present future work suggestions for systems engineering application 
to aircraft electromagnetic environmental study and mitigation of the hazardous effects. 
4.1 Introduction 
The electromagnetic (EM) environmental effects in aircraft systems have been of 
continuing concern to aviation industry since radios were first installed on aircraft in the 1920s. 
The EM energy coupling diagram is shown in Fig. 26, where the EM problem situation is parsed 
into three fundamental components: EM energy source, transfer path, and receptor [81]. The first 
component in this diagram, the source of EM energy, encompasses a variety of natural and man-
made environmental sources. Typical EM energy sources for aircraft include lightning stroke 
attachment, high intensity radiated fields (HIRF) from airport radars and broadcast transmitters, 
portable electronic devices (PEDs), precipitation static (P-static), and emissions from equipment 
within the aircraft as illustrated in the E3 context diagram of Fig.27. The mathematics for EM 
energy coupling is readily available in public literature [82]. For electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) considerations, the general convention is that 
both the source and receptor are located within the aircraft. However, some authors include 
lightning and HIRF in the broad category of EMC discussion [83]. We consider it is a matter of 
personal preference. The EM sources for modern aircraft have become progressively more severe 
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in recent years. Although the natural environment of lightning and P-static has not changed, the 
man-made EM environment in aircraft has changed for the worse with the introduction of new 
PEDs such as mobile phones, email, web browsing, text messaging, and mobile audio/video 
services since the early 1990s [84,85]. This PEDs energy coupling is modeled in Fig. 28 showing 
some details. The transmitting power of HIRF sources such as airport radars and radio transmitters 
has been increasing. The second component in Fig. 26, the transfer path of EM energy, has also 
been changing for the worse due to growing application of composite materials in airframe, which 
 
Figure 27. Aircraft electromagnetic effect context diagram 
 
 
Figure 28. Portable electronic device energy coupling diagram with OPM modeling. PEDs EM 
sources are part of the environment with dotted lines 
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are relatively transparent to EM energy transmission and provides less protection to aircraft [86]. 
The ever-increasing density of electronics in modern aircraft makes the third component in the 
Fig. 26 diagram, the receptor, more susceptible to EM energy. Coupling diagrams for other E3 
threats are shown in Figures 28, 29, 30, and 31. These are modeled with OPM as shown in Fig. 
32. Modeling of EM energy coupling is important since the communication, navigation and 
surveillance (CNS) functions and flight control functions (fly-by-wire) in modern aircraft are 
performed entirely by electronics [87], increasing their vulnerability to EM energy.  
The phenomenon of EM effects in aircraft is complex, interrelated, dynamic, and open, 
which means EM problems are best addressed by systems approach [88,89]. The EM effects are 
complex because aircraft structure represents complicated EM boundary conditions; are 
 
Figure 30. Lightning energy coupling diagram with OPM modeling. Note the lightning source is 
part of environment with dotted lines 
 
Figure 31. HIRF energy coupling diagram with OPM modeling. HIRF energy source is part of the 
environment with dotted lines 
 
Figure 29. EMI energy coupling diagram with OPM modeling. Note the crosstalk emitter is part of the 
system with solid lines 
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interrelated because of intricate mutual dependency among electric field, magnetic field and 
electric current; are dynamic because of time dependency of governing Maxwell’s equations; and 
are open because the aircraft is an open system with its electromagnetic environment. This 
complexity of EM environment was illustrated in Fig. 27 with at least five EM threats to aircraft. 
EM effects in aircraft fit the definition of system, and research of EM issues using system concept 
 
 
Figure 32. Modeling of EM energy source coupling to receptor with OPM in OPCAT suite 
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is appropriate and beneficial. Risk analysis is a discipline formally recognized in systems 
engineering standards [90]. Risk analysis and management is one of the essential tasks of systems 
engineering, which requires a broad knowledge of the system and its critical elements as a whole. 
Risk can be viewed as degradation in emergence of systems. The electromagnetic risks occur at a 
system or at a subsystem level. Risks are either absence or degradation of emergent functionality 
such as function, performance, or ilities. Risk may also be viewed as an undesirable emergent 
property. For the emergence at the subsystem level, risks also emerge at the subsystem level. For 
the function at the component level, risk may occur at the component level. However this risk at 
the component level is different than the one for the system level. In summary, risks may occur at 
all levels just like functions may operate at all levels. In particular, systems engineering is crucial 
to the decision of how to achieve the best balance in risk management [91]. Risk modeling is 
illustrated in Fig. 33. Desirable flying function which is a designed functionality is shown on the 
left side in Fig. 33. Undesirable and unanticipated occurrence of crashing is shown on the right 
side in Fig. 33. The potential of this occurrence was there before the crashing, which represents 
 
Figure 33. Modeling of emergent properties of flying (Left) and crashing (Right) with OPM 
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risk as an emergent property of a system. This risk should be identified and managed by risk 
analysis modeling and processes. Table 12 lists some of the desirable emergent properties and 
undesirable properties of aircraft. 
Risk analysis is essential when we deal with safety or threat issues of any system. EM 
threat in aircraft is a safety issue regulated by governmental agencies such as Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), or European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The governing FAA 
regulations of EMC are 14 CFR Part 25.1353(a) and 25.1431(c), which state that any electrical 
interference likely to be present in the airplane must not result in hazardous effects on the airplane 
or its systems. 
In public literature, EM risk analysis has been conducted quite extensively. It has been 
applied to electronic systems [92,93,94,95], high power electromagnetics [96], medical systems 
[97], and space systems [98]. However, these papers do not utilize the Standard Risk Model. Also 
Table 12. Emergent properties of aircraft 
Emergent property Note 
Transportation of passengers and crew (emergent feature) 
 
Emergent feature 
Flight performance Part of functionality 
Stability and control Performance emergence 
Cost Economic emergence 
Aerodynamics Function emergence 
Ilities (Safety, reliability, maintainability) Emergence over lifecycle 
Anomalies or accidents Undesirable unanticipated  
Volume Emergent feature 
 
70 
they do not emphasize the need for systems engineering perspective. We intend to fill this gap in 
this paper and develop system level EM risk analysis in aircraft.  
We first discuss the system concept with respect to the aircraft EM concerns in Section 4.2. 
Next, we describe the Standard Risk Modeling process [99] in Section 4.3 and identify the risk 
events, impacts, and drivers of EM effects in aircraft in Section 4.4. Then we discuss the EM risk 
mitigation in aircraft by developing risk monitoring plans with a risk map, risk as well as the event 
prevention and impact contingency plans. We conclude with a summary and future work 
suggestions. 
4.2 Applicability of System Concept 
The meaning of “system” is broad and diverse. Blanchard and Fabrycky defines system as 
an assemblage or combination of functionally related elements or parts forming a unitary whole 
[100]. In Systems Engineering, a system refers to a complex engineered entity that requires 
combined inputs of specialists representing a wide variety of engineering and related disciplines, 
of which power system of Fig. 34 is one example. Against the backdrop of this discussion, we may 
 
Figure 34. Airplane power system 
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consider all of the subtle, complex, integrated electromagnetic interactions in and around aircraft 
as a whole, a system. This electromagnetic system is the subject of our discussion. We note that a 
systems approach involves “perspective” of how one sees the entity. Aircraft may be viewed from 
various perspectives such as aerodynamic, propulsion, structure, or electromagnetic [101]. In our 
case, EM system is an aspect of an aircraft which includes any subsystem and components which 
interact with EM energy emanating from outside and within aircraft [102]. 
Since the risk analysis is performed at the system level, it is necessary to review the aircraft 
subsystems that are relevant to this risk analysis work. In particular the power subsystem in Fig. 
34 and the power distribution system in Fig. 35 are important since they often become the source 
of electromagnetic interference. 
For in-flight operations, power comes from an integrated drive generator (IDG) on each 
engine or from the APU generator as shown in Fig. 34. A hydraulic motor generator (HMG) system 
operates as a back-up source if there is a loss of all main electrical power. The HMG does not have 
a time limit for operation [103]. 
 
 





Electrical power comes through the ac and dc distribution systems as in Fig. 35. The ac 
distribution system has these buses: The IDG connects to its bus through the closed generator 
circuit breaker (GCB). The power output of the APU generator or external power cart can also 
connect to the ac buses through the closed auxiliary power breaker (APB) or external power 
contactor (EPC). The operation of the related bus tie breaker (BTB) prevents parallel operation of 
the IDGs or two sources on the main buses. The ground service bus gets power from the right main 
ac bus when the right bus has power. If the right bus is off, the ground service bus can get power 
from external power or the APU generator when you push the ground service switch. If external 
and APU power are available, external power supplies power to the bus. 
There are two transfer buses, the captain and the first officer. The captain transfer bus 
usually gets power from the left ac bus. If the left ac bus does not have power, the instrument 
transfer bus gets power from the right ac bus. The first officer transfer bus usually gets power from 
the right ac bus but changes to the left ac bus if there is a loss of right ac bus power. 
The left and right transfer buses usually get power from their main bus. The transfer buses 
get power from the hydraulic motor generator (HMG) if the two main ac buses have a power loss 
in flight or during a maintenance test of the HMG. The center ac bus receives power from the left 
main bus. During autoland operations the center ac bus receives power from the static inverter. 
During autoland the static inverter receives power from the hot battery bus. This bus isolation 
makes sure the autopilots are on three isolated ac sources. The standby ac bus gets power from the 
left transfer bus but changes to the static inverter when these are all true: Two utility buses get 
power from their main ac bus through a utility bus relay (UBR). If the electrical load is more than 
the generation capacity, the UBRs open and remove utility loads from the generators. Next we 
would like introduce a standard risk analysis modeling for electromagnetic environmental effects.  
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4.3 Standard Risk Model for E3 
Risk is defined as the potential that something will go wrong as a result of an event or a 
series of events. [104]. We find the standard risk model (SRM) illustrated in Fig. 36 to be the one 
most helpful to understand risks and to develop mitigation methods of risks. The standard risk 
model in Fig. 36 in EM situation has several components [105]: 
(1) Risk event: The happening or state that “triggers” a loss in safety or economic value. The 
risk events may be specific and concrete EM hazards or incidents. 
(2) Risk event driver: Something existing in the event environment that leads one to believe 
that a particular risk event such as EM incident could occur. 
(3) Impact of a risk: The consequence or potential loss that might result if a risk event occurs. 
In a complicated situation such as an EM problem situation, the impact may not be a simple 
consequence, but impact itself may have system-subsystem-component structure.  
(4) Impact driver: Something existing in the problem situation that leads one to believe that a 
particular impact such as system level EM damage or upset could occur. 
(5) Total loss: The magnitude of the actual loss value accrued when a risk event occurs; it 
could be measured in days or money, but in complex situations, level of safety or function 
 















criticality must be considered, preventing simplistic monetary value representation. In 
other words, it may be qualitative rather than quantitative and can be evaluated by levels 
of criticality. 
(6) Probability values: Probability values are assigned to EM risk events and impacts.  
The Standard Risk Model is selected for the aircraft EM risk analysis because of the following 
advantages of the model: 
(1) The Standard Risk Model is fairly simple to understand and captures the essence of 
resolving risks.  
(2) It clearly separates risk events and their impact, thus, supporting cause and effect analysis.  
(3) Separating risk and impact reinforces the notion of prevention or contingency planning for 
risks. The Standard Risk Model is supported by ISO 31000:2009 and it may be applied to 
any industry “regardless of its size, activity or sector” [106].  
(4) By allocating the drivers related to a risk event, we can identify the threats and deal with 
those that contribute the most to risk events.  
Because this is a standard model widely used internationally, it will be easier to compare the risks 
against known risks in other similar projects. This allows us to address similar risks with less 
resources, helps prioritize risks, and focuses us on unresolved risks. The risks are evaluated by 
computing expected loss, which is the average (mean) loss associated with a risk. Expected loss is 
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calculated by multiplying the probabilities of risk event, probabilities of impact, and total loss as 
shown in Fig. 37. The significance of this diagram goes beyond simplistic quantification of risks 
and consequent losses. The essential insight in Fig. 37 is to recognize two important concepts in 
risk discussions: how likely is the risk (likelihood)? How critical is the consequence of the risk 
event (criticality)? We note these two concepts are common factors in most failure analysis or risk 
analysis methods. 
The standard model process starts with risk identification, then proceeds to probability 
calculation of risks, prioritization of the risks, and resolution of risks. Lastly, the risk is continually 
monitored. 
4.4 Electromagnetic Risk Events, Impacts and Drivers 
In this Section, we identify electromagnetic risk events and their impacts in aircraft 
according to the Standard Risk Model.  
 
 
Figure 38. Direct lightning effect due to swept strokes on aircraft  
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4.4.1 Risk Event Identification in Aircraft Electromagnetic Environment 
We identified seven main risk event categories related to electromagnetic environment in 
aircraft as follows by carefully analyzing the electromagnetic threat situation: 
(1) Direct lightning strike represents several risk events: (1.a) fuel tank explosion, (1.b) rudder 
conductive frame damage, (1.c) fasteners damage, (1.d) damage to bonding jumpers of 
main wing flight control surface or doors, (1.e) engine damage, (1.f) antenna damage, and 
(1.g) radome puncture. The direct lightning effect is illustrated in Fig. 38, where swept 
stroke attachment is shown. The lightning attachment was stationary but the aircraft 
continued moving forward, which resulted in sweeping of the lightning energy over the 
aircraft surface. 
(2) Indirect lightning events occur when the lightning current on the aircraft surface generates 
magnetic fields which induce voltage on the wire bundles. The equipment these wires are 
connected to experience upsets or damages.  
 
 
Figure 39. HIRF effect in aircraft context diagram 
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(3) HIRF events couple the energy from airport radars and radio transmitters to the wires 
located in un-pressurized area of aircraft. Fig. 39 shows the HIRF sources for aircraft.  
(4) PEDs front door risk events represent EM energy coupling via aircraft antennas: The PEDs 
front door coupling measurement through windows is illustrated in Fig. 40. 
(5) PEDs back door risk events occur due to EM energy back door coupling from PEDs 
emissions to aircraft wires as illustrated in Fig. 41. 
(6) P-static risk events which affect radio communication and navi29ation of aircraft. 
(7) Equipment to equipment interference events occurs when emitted EM emission energy is 
coupled to another equipment via wires or antennas. 
 














Figure 41. PEDs back door coupling 
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4.4.2 Drivers for Risk Events  
Drivers for the seven risk events are identified as follows: 
(1) Drivers for direct lightning risk events are: (1.a.1) flammable vapor in fuel tank, (1.a.2) 
triggering sparks from lightning stroke attachment around fuel tank, (1.a.3) vapor 
temperature, (b) to (g): improper grounding, damaged or missing bonding jumpers, 
corrosion which impedes lightning current flow, and conductive frame damage due to 
erosion by water ingress. 
(2) Drivers for Indirect lightning events are: lack or inadequate grounding of equipment, 
corrosion of wire bundle over-braid and connectors due to water ingress, hydraulic fluid or 
airport de-icing fluid ingress.  
(3) Drivers for HIRF energy coupling to equipment via wires in un-pressurized area of aircraft 
are: high impedance on connectors or over-braid of wire bundles. Corrosion and wire 
bundle defects are the major factors.  
(4) Drivers for PEDs front door coupling risk events: unsatisfactory interference path loss 
(IPL) performance. 
(5) Drivers for PEDS back door coupling risk events: close proximity of PEDs to wires, high 
susceptibility of equipment, and high level emission of PEDs. 
(6) Drivers for P-static risk events: damaged or lack of static dischargers, inadequate anti-static 
paints 
(7) Drivers for equipment to equipment: inadequate separation distance between power wires 
and sensor wires, inadequate isolation between antennas in terms of frequency, angle, 
polarization, and distance. 
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4.4.3 Impact Identification in Aircraft Electromagnetic Environment 
We identify the impacts of these risk events as a next step. The risk events are specific and 
may be defined at the component level, whereas the impacts of risk events may have system level 
implication and, for the most part, are multi-leveled, meaning impacts occur at the system level as 
well as at the component level. This multi-level nature of impact may be cogently understood in 
terms of hierarchy discussion in the Systems Engineering discipline. Academic discourse of this 
subject has been well developed within the context of organizational hierarchy using axis of 
organization taxonomy concept in model-based systems engineering [107].  
Impacts of direct lightning risk events are the total loss (fuel tank ignition), compromised 
flight controls due to damaged bonding jumpers at the rudder, or flight control surfaces, weakened 
structure due to fasteners damage, and compromised aircraft landing systems due to lightning 
damaged spoiler. 
Impacts of indirect lightning risk events and HIRF are the disabled or upset flight control 
system or whichever system the risk event may occur at. The system level impact implication 
should be considered. 
Impacts of PEDs risk events occur at the communications and navigation system level as 
well as at direct cross-coupling with wires. In other words, depending on the location or extent of 
the risk event, the specific system impacted by the risk event and system level implication of the 
impact should be examined. 
Impacts of P-static risk events occur at the radio communication system level. 
Impacts of equipment to equipment EM interference are temporary malfunction or 
permanent damage of each sensor or control system. 
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4.4.4 Drivers for Impacts 
The impacts generally occur at the system level, and thus the drivers for each impact should 
be found at the system level as well. The example drivers for these system level impacts are 
inadequate error corrections, lack of redundancies, poor bonding and grounding schemes of 
aircraft, inadequate electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS) configuration and antenna 
siting geometry. These are usually design configuration issues at the system level. 
4.5 Risk Resolution 
Fig. 42 describes several ways of risk resolution. In this Section, we discuss the risk 
resolution steps by creating and examining risk tables and risk maps. Risk levels are first evaluated 
and expressed as expected loss. The expected loss is obtained by multiplying the risk likelihood 
and total loss. The risk likelihood in turn is calculated by multiplying the risk event probability 
and the impact probability. These components are tabulated and a risk map is plotted from the 
 
 
Figure 42. Risk resolution diagram 
Risk Resolution












tabulated data. After the risk table and the risk map are developed, the risk levels of each risk event 
are examined with respect to a risk threshold. The risk threshold is a unique quantity for each 
project determined by the stakeholders. For the risks below the threshold curve, the risks are 
monitored but no actions may be taken. For risk events above the threshold curve, risk mitigation 
actions such as risk event prevention actions or impact contingency actions are taken. These 
processes are discussed in detail in the next three sections.  



















1.a Fuel tank explosion 1.0E-09 9.0E-01 9.0E-10 250 2.25E-07
1.b Rudder damage 1.0E-06 1.0E-01 1.0E-07 0.1 1.0E-08
1.c Fasteners damage 1.0E-05 5.0E-02 5.0E-07 0.2 1.0E-07
1.d Compromised FCS 1.0E-06 1.0E-01 1.0E-07 0.3 3.0E-08
1.e Engine damage 1.0E-07 5.0E-02 5.0E-09 1 5.0E-09
1.f Antenna damage 1.0E-04 2.0E-01 2.0E-05 0.05 1.0E-06
1.g Radome puncture 1.0E-05 3.0E-01 3.0E-06 0.25 7.5E-07
2 Ind lightning event 1.0E-04 2.5E-01 2.5E-05 0.1 2.5E-06
3 HIRF event 1.0E-04 1.0E-02 1.0E-06 0.1 1.0E-07
4 PEDs front door 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-10 0.01 1.0E-12
5 PEDs back door 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-10 0.01 1.0E-12
6 P-static 1.0E-03 1.0E-01 1.0E-04 0.01 1.0E-06
7 Equipment to equip 1.0E-03 2.0E-01 2.0E-04 0.01 2.0E-06
 Table 14. EMI criticality category level 
 
 
CAT 1 Non-electronic equipment DC relays, DC solenoids, brushless induction motor
CAT 2 Non-electronic equipment AC operated relays and solenoids
CAT 3 Electrical/Electronic equipment non-essential, susceptibility to wire-coupled or 
radiated EMI
CAT 4 Electrical/electronic Critical or essential, susceptibility to wire-coupled or EMI
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4.5.1 Risk Evaluation and Monitoring Based on Risk Map 
Risk evaluation sets the stage for the next actions in the way discussed above. As illustrated in Fig. 
37, expected loss values are calculated by multiplying the risk even probability, impact probability 
and the total loss as the equation (1) below shows: 
𝑃𝑒  × 𝑃𝑖 ×  𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿𝑒         (1) 
Where 
𝑃𝑒 = Probability of risk event, 
𝑃𝑖 = Probability of impact, 
𝐿𝑡 = Total loss, 
𝐿𝑒= Expected loss 
Based on the probabilities of risk events, probabilities of impact, and total loss in Tables 13, 14 
and 15, a risk map is developed as shown in Fig. 43. The probability numbers are not specific to 
any aircraft model and they are presented as representation for illustration purposes. Note the y-
axis, the Risk Likelihood, is in a logarithmic scale. Since the risk event (1.a), the fuel tank 
explosion, is an extreme outlier to the rest of the risk events, it is not included in Fig. 43. The way 
this risk map is developed is as follows: Firstly, we estimate the risk likelihood by multiplying the 
probability of the risk event and the probability of the impact. As an example, the risk event 








4 Critical Catastrophic A
4 Essential Hazardous/ Severe – Major B
4 Essential Major C
3 Non-Essential Minor D/E
2 Any Any Any
1 Any Any Any
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probability of the rudder damage (risk event ID 1.b) is estimated to be 1 × 10−6 and the probability 
of the impact is estimated to be 1 × 10−1. Thus the risk likelihood is calculated to be 1 × 10−7. If 
this event is realized, the total cost of reaping the rudder is estimated to be $100,000, which is the 
total loss. Therefore, the expected loss is calculated to be one cent. This insignificant dollar figure 
is due to the extremely small probability of occurrence of the event.  
All of the events listed in Table 13 are plotted in the Fig. 43 risk map by continual 
application of this process. The threshold was determined to be five cents in this example. By 
examining the risk map, the risk status of each risk event is clearly understood with respect to a 
threshold curve specific to an aircraft. We may accept the risk level of the risk events that are 
located below the threshold curve and choose not to address the risk events but simply monitor the 
risk level. By application of risk mitigation plans, we intend to move the risk events located above 
the threshold curve to locations below the threshold curve. After mitigation plans are implemented, 
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the probabilities of risk events and probabilities of impacts should decrease and thus the expected 
loss values should be reduced. The essence of risk management is to monitor this movement of 
risk events on the risk map. The probabilities of risk events and impacts, total losses, and threshold 
values depend on the specific aircraft model under consideration. The risk modeling considered so 
far may be summarized as shown in Fig. 44. This flow diagram includes the entire processes and 
thus it represents the overall modeling of the whole risk analysis processes.  
 

































4.5.2 Risk Event Prevention Plan 
As discussed previously, risk events are specific and concrete and may occur at the 
component level. Drivers of risk events are the facts that describe the causes of the events. 
Therefore the risk prevention comes out naturally by examining the risk event drivers carefully. 
For the direct lightning effects; examination of the (1.a.1) driver, the flammable vapors in fuel 
tank, leads one to the need for making the fuel tank vapor inflammable by using such equipment 
as nitrogen generating system (NGS). For (1.a.2) driver, sparking around the fuel tank suggests a 
good bonding and grounding scheme of the fuel tank. Examination of the (1.a.3) driver, high vapor 
temperature, leads one to the need to implementation of cooling mechanism around the fuel tank. 
This way we may develop the necessary preventive plan in a logical and systematic manner. 
Examination of the driver for events (b) to (g), damaged bonding jumpers and corrosion, leads one 
to establishment of the preventive plan of designing rugged and corrosion resistant bonding 
jumpers and wire bundles. For the indirect lightning and HIRF effects, review of the driver, the 
inadequate grounding, leads one to the need for a better grounding method of equipment and wire 
bundles. Review of the driver, and corrosion leads one to the need for protective design of wire 
bundles and connectors from corrosion. 
For the PEDs front door electromagnetic coupling, review of the driver, high IPL 
(interference path loss), leads one to redesign consideration of aircraft windows and antennas siting 
geometry. Review of the back door coupling driver, high level electromagnetic coupling from 
PEDs to equipment wires, leads one to the need for adjusting separation distance and immunity 
improvement of aircraft equipment through EMI filters and better grounding. 
For P-static risk event, review of the driver, inadequate static dischargers, leads one to 
consideration of better static dischargers such as the ones.  
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For the equipment to equipment EMC, review of the driver, inadequate wires separation and 
antennas isolation, leads one to re-design of wire installation and antenna configuration to meet 
the requirements of wire separation and antenna isolation. 
4.5 3 Impact Contingency Plan 
The impact and impact contingency plan occur at the system or subsystems level. The 
electromagnetic system can be subdivided into several subsystems such as flight control 
electromagnetic system, sensor electromagnetic system, fuel electromagnetic system, and others. 
For each subsystem, the contingency plan is achieved by examining the drivers for the impacts in 
the same way the risk event prevention plan was produced by examining the drivers for the risk 
events. Thus the concept of redundancy, error correction coding, software design, and system level 
grounding implementation including bonding jumper system level analysis is utilized to establish 
the impact contingency plan. The risk event prevention and impact contingency plan emerge in a 
systematic manner by carefully examining the risk event drivers and impact drivers with the 
standard risk model tool and systems engineering approach. 
4.6 Chapter Conclusions 
We have taken systems engineering approach and applied the standard risk model to 
electromagnetic environmental hazards analysis and mitigation in aircraft. The nature of 
electromagnetic energy interacting with aircraft and aircraft components lends itself well to 
systems engineering, risk analysis and risk management. Major risk events and impacts for aircraft 
electromagnetic hazards were identified and their drivers have been discussed. Risk prevention 
and impact contingency plans and risk monitoring methodology for aircraft electromagnetic 
hazards have been developed. We have shown that the systems engineering and standard risk 
model analysis for electromagnetic hazards in aircraft is appropriate and beneficial. Future work 
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includes extending this approach to electromagnetic design details in aircraft to completion so that 
comprehensive electromagnetic database resource may become available to aviation industry. 
Quantification of risk event and impact probabilities in aircraft is quite a complex endeavor and 
further research based on analysis and testing is required. 
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5. Risk Analysis of Lightning Effects in Aircraft 
 
 
 The lightning effects in aircraft have been known since the early days of aviation, and still 
they are a subject of active research. Because the lightning issues in aircraft are of safety concern, 
governmental agencies require aircraft manufacturers to evaluate and mitigate the hazardous 
effects of lightning in aircraft and maintain high safety standards. In order to have commercial 
transportation aircraft be certified, aircraft manufacturers must prove they meet the strict 
governmental safety regulations. Thus conducting a risk analysis of lightning effects in aircraft is 
an essential task. Additionally, due to highly complex, dynamic and interrelated nature of the 
lightning strike effects on aircraft, it would be prudent to take a systems engineering approach to 
understand and address overall lightning effects in aircraft. In this paper, we intend to perform risk 
analysis of lightning hazardous effects in aircraft at a system level to assess and mitigate the 
lightning risks.  
We examine the interaction of lightning with aircraft in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. We then 
introduce the Standard Risk Model in Section 5.3, and apply the model to lightning risk event and 
impact identification in Section 5.4. We next develop drivers for each lightning risk event and 
impact, and present the baseline of risk prevention and impact contingency plan for lightning 
hazard mitigation. We conclude with a summary and suggestions for the future work of aircraft 
lightning protection. 
5.1 Introduction  
It is well-known that an average of one lightning stroke attachment can be expected for 
each 3,000 hours of flight for any type of commercial transport aircraft [108]. The effects of these 
lightning strikes on aircraft have been a continuing concern to aviation industry since the early 
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days of the aviation era. Because lightning hazards present aviation safety concerns, these issues 
are regulated by governmental rules such as the Title 14, Code of Federal Regulation (14 CFR) 
25.581 and 25.981 for direct effects, 25.954 and 25.981 for fuel tanks, and 25.1316 for indirect 
effects. Regulation codes may vary for different aircraft models. CFR 25.581 states that the 
airplane must be protected against catastrophic effects from lightning, and CFR 25.954 states the 
fuel system must be designed and arranged to prevent the ignition of fuel vapor within the system 
by direct lightning, swept lightning, or corona and streamering at fuel vent outlets. The electrical 
and electronic system lightning protection regulation is found in CFR 25.1316. 
The basic components of lightning energy transfer diagram are shown in Fig. 45, where 
the lightning problem situation is decomposed into three components: lightning energy source, 
transfer path for lightning energy, and receptor of the lightning energy. This diagram emphasizes 
the fact that the three-component framework commonly used in EMC discipline is equally 
applicable to lightning energy transfer [109].  
The generation of lightning energy, the first component of the Fig. 45 diagram, occurs 
naturally, therefore the electromagnetic environment of lightning does not change significantly 
over time. However, there is a clear evidence that lightning flashes could be triggered by aircraft 
when aircraft is flown into clouds. A large percentage of lightning strikes to aircraft have evidently 
been triggered by and initiated at the aircraft, although the occurrence percentage of aircraft-
triggered strikes is not known. An empirical study shows the necessary potential discontinuity 
 
Figure 45. Lightning energy transfer model diagram 
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between an air vehicle and the adjacent atmosphere may reach 106 V before the lightning leader 
can be initiated from the vehicle [110]. The lightning strike probability of aircraft changes as a 
function of altitudes and weather conditions.  
For a discussion of the second element in Fig. 45, the transfer path, we note the lightning 
energy is transferred to aircraft equipment via magnetically induced voltages. When a lightning 
stroke attaches to aircraft, subsequent current flow on the aircraft produces strong magnetic fields, 
which surround the conductive airframe and change rapidly as a function of the fast changing 
lightning stroke currents. Part of this magnetic flux could leak inside the aircraft through apertures, 
such as windows, composite fairings, door seams or joints. These internal fields couple through 
electrical wire circuits and induce voltages in them in proportion to the rate of change of the 
magnetic flux. The magnetically induced voltages could appear between wires of bundles as line-
to-line voltages or between wire and airframe as common mode voltages. Resulting damages or 
upsets of electrical equipment by these induced voltages are referred to as indirect effects of 
lightning. Thus the lightning coupling paths are comprised of the aircraft surface and the affected 
wire bundles.  
In order to investigate the indirect lightning effects further, lightning strike configurations 
may be examined. The lightning strike configurations refer to the lightning current path from the 
entry point to the exit point. The lightning entry and exit points may be understood in terms of 
zoning of the aircraft, which is discussed in Section 5.2. Probability of occurrence could be 
assessed for each strike configuration. The lightning strike configurations which commonly occur 
are the paths from an extremity point to another extremity point. Typical strike patterns used to 
test and assess the lightning effects at the aircraft level are available in public literature [111]: (1) 
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nose radome to engine’s aft, (2) nose radome to main landing gear, (3) nose radome to an extremity 
aft of nose, (4) nose radome to wing tip, (5) nose radome to tailcone, and (6) nose radome to 
horizontal /vertical stabilizer and elevator. Other severe lightning strike configurations include (7) 
wing tip to tail, (8) wing tip to wing tip, and (9) landing gear to tail. We selected such lightning 
strike configurations as typical examples knowing that they do not cover all possible lightning 
paths. Actual current paths depend on individual aircraft model and geometry. This lightning 
energy coupling can be modeled with OPM as shown in Fig. 46. The lightning energy is in the 
environment, not in the system, therefore is surrounded by dotted line. The lightning energy 
changes the state of the receptor electronics, which is shown as stage change in the diagram. The 
lightning energy receptor occupies the aircraft, which is also shown in Fig. 46. 
 
 
Figure 46. Lightning energy coupling modeling with OPM 
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We note that the airframe as a lightning energy transfer path has in recent years changed 
for the worse due to growing usage of composite material in its manufacturing. Composite material 
is not as conductive as aluminum is and it does not provide as good lightning protection to aircraft 
equipment as aluminum material does. In order to understand the role of wire bundles as lightning 
energy transfer path, we also need to consider wire bundle routing.  
When the wire bundles are installed in parallel to the lightning strike configuration, the 
equipment connected to these wires are affected most significantly. The wires that are routed 
perpendicularly to the strike configuration are affected the least. This is due to the difference in 
energy coupling mechanism discussed earlier in this section.  
Example wire routes that are parallel to the strike configurations listed above are as 
follows: (1) upper nose to engine, (2) lower nose to main landing gear, (3) lower nose to lower 
nose, (4) lower nose to main wheel well and wing trailing edge, (5) lower nose to aft stair, (6) 
lower nose to tailcone interfaces, (7) wing trailing edge to engine, (8) flight control wires, and (9) 
landing gear control wires. The energy transfer from current flow on the aircraft surface to wires 
occurs through lightning current diffusion, redistribution, or coupling through such apertures as 
cockpit and cabin windows, non-conductive access panels, wheel wells, wing aft cavities and 
weather sealed joints. 
The third component of Fig. 45, the receptor of the lightning energy, is mainly the aircraft 
equipment on or inside the aircraft that are connected to the wire bundles mentioned in the previous 
paragraph [112]: (1) electronic engine control (EEC), (2) wheel speed transducer, (3) angle of 
attack, (4) position sensor of aileron, spoiler, flap, (5) aft stair up switching, (6) rudder position 
sensor, (7) fuel temp probe, (8) flight control sensors and actuators, and (9) landing gear control. 
When the received energy is greater than the equipment threshold, the receptor equipment act in 
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an undesired manner, which constitutes interference. Impacts of the events due to malfunction of 
these equipment could be beyond the equipment level. The impacts may have the unit-subsystem-
system structure. 
The indirect effects discussed above are becoming more important because of (1) growing 
use of composite material in airframe, (2) trend toward miniaturization of electronics, (3) 
increasing use of electronics in communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS) and flight 
control (Fly-by-wire), and (4) more frequent flight through adverse weather conditions. 
In regard to direct lightning effects, we note the lightning stroke attachments transfer 
energy to the aircraft skin, structure, equipment or bundles directly, causing damages as holes 
burned at metal skins, punctures or splinters of non-conductive parts, or welding of moveable 
hinges and bearings, and tearing, vaporization and blasting of aircraft structures. The receptors of 
the lightning energy for direct effect consideration are such aircraft structural components as nose 
radome, flight deck windows, fuselage, antennas, empennage, wings, wing tips, lights, engines, 
integrated drive generators (IDG), landing gears, and empennage tips. 
There is another category of effects which is fuel tank explosion. This category is due to a 
combination of direct effects and indirect effects. The lightning strikes on or near the fuel tank 
area could cause a catastrophic events. Fuel tanks are located in zone 3 which is rarely hit by 
lightning. Thus it would be more likely that the effects will be indirect and the fuel tank may be 
subject to conducted currents. This cause sparking in the fastener area or gasket area in the fuel 
tank and that energy may get into the fuel tank. Thus a very careful design of fasteners, gaskets, 
and fuel tank structure are required to avoid such catastrophic events. Other consideration on this 
topic includes paint thickness. It is known that thicker paint may allow lightning energy to arrest 
for a longer time than thinner paint does. 
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5.2 Lightning Attachment Zones 
It is not possible to deterministically predict where on aircraft the next lightning strike will 
be attached. However, the general area where the lightning strokes attach may be estimated by 
examining lightning attachment zones on aircraft as shown in Fig. 47 [113]. SAE Aerospace 
published ARP 5414A which contains the following zone definitions as well as methods used to 
 
 
Figure 47. Lightning zone of aircraft 
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determine lightning zoning for aircraft [114]. Zones represent the external lightning strike 
environment as applied to the aircraft, and they often vary from one aircraft to another. Zone 1A 
refers to areas of aircraft surface where a first return stroke is likely during lightning channel 
attachment with a low expectation of flash hang on. Zone 1B refers to all areas of aircraft surface 
where a first return stroke is likely during lightning channel attachment with a high expectation of 
flash hang on. Zone 1C refers to all areas of aircraft surface where a first return stroke of reduced 
amplitude is likely during lightning channel attachment with a low expectation of flash hang on. 
Zone 2A refers to areas of aircraft surface where subsequent return stroke is likely to be swept 
with a low expectation of flash hang on. Zone 2B refers to areas of aircraft surface into which a 
lightning channel carrying a subsequent return stroke is likely to be swept with a high expectation 
of flash hang on. Zone 3 refers to the surface areas not in Zones 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, or 2B, where any 
attachment of lightning channel is unlikely, and those portions of the aircraft that lie beneath or 
between the other zones and/or conduct substantial amount of electrical current between direct or 
swept stroke attachment points. Lightning attachments usually occur in Zone 1 but exit from a 
different Zone 1 area. As a continuous ionized channel is formed between charge centers, the 
ensuing currents that flow through the channel may persist for up to a second or more. The channel 
remains in its original location but the aircraft continues to move forward a significant distance 
during the life of the flash. Thus, in addition to initial entry and exit points, different final entry 
and final exit points form over the aircraft. The lightning currents are distributed widely throughout 
the surface of aircraft. In consideration of this wide current distribution and the global nature of 
the associated magnetic field effects, systems engineering approach in general, and a system risk 
analysis in particular, are taken in examining the lightning situation in aircraft [115, 116, 117]. 
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5.3 Standard Risk Model for Lightning 
For the rest of the paper, we discuss definition, assessment and mitigation of lightning risks 
in aircraft. We find the standard risk model (SRM) illustrated in Fig. 48 to be the one most useful 
to understand risks and develop mitigation methods [118]. In the SRM illustrated in Fig. 48, risk 
is understood as the potential that something will go wrong as a result of an event or a series of 
events. SRM contains the following components in its risk evaluation process: 
(1) Risk event: The happening or state that “triggers” a loss in safety or economic value. 
The risk events may be a specific and concrete lightning incident or a hazardous event. 
(2) Driver of a risk event: Something existing in the event environment that leads one to 
believe that a particular risk such as lightning incidents could occur. 
(3) Impact of a risk: The consequence or potential loss that might result if a risk event 
occurs. In a complicated situation such as a lightning stroke attachment to aircraft, the 
impact may not always be a damage isolated at a component level, but it could be a 
widespread effect at a system level.  
 
 
















(4) Impact driver: Something existing in the lightning problem situation that leads one to 
believe that a particular impact such as a system level loss could occur. 
(5) Total loss: The magnitude of the actual loss value accrued when a risk event occurs; it 
could be measured in days or money, but in complex situations, a simplistic monetary 
or time value representation may not be feasible. In other words, it may be represented 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively in terms of equipment criticality or failure 
condition classifications. The expected loss calculation using the total loss is shown in 
Fig. 49. 
(6) Probability values: Probability values are assigned to lightning risk events and impacts. 
The Standard Risk Model is used for the aircraft lightning risk analysis because of the 
following advantages of the model: 
(1) The Standard Risk Model process is simple and easy to understand and it captures the 
essence of risk resolution.  
(2) It separates risk events and impact, and supports cause and effect analysis.  
(3) It evaluates the risk values enabling risk monitoring via risk maps possible. 
SRM is a standard model widely accepted internationally, therefore it will be easier to 
compare the risks against known risks in other similar projects. This allows us to address similar 
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risks with less resources, helps prioritize risks, and enables us to focus on unresolved risks. The 
risks are evaluated by computing expected loss, which is the average (mean) loss. A probabilistic 
risk analysis work with somewhat different approach from the present paper has been published 
for intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) situations [119] 
5.4 Risk Events, Impacts and Drivers 
We identify the lightning risk events, impacts and drivers in aircraft according to the 
Standard Risk Model. Even though aircraft manufacturers have made excellent progress in 
lightning protection, inspection and repair methods, lightning strikes still cause airlines costly 
interruptions for revenue flight services [120].  
5.4.1 Risk Events for Lightning Effects 
Lightning stroke attachments as illustrated in Fig. 50 generate both direct and indirect 
hazardous effects in aircraft. Typical risk events are listed below [121]:  
Lightning direct effect event is illustrated in Fig. 50 and several such events are listed as follows: 
(1) Melt-through damage for metal or non-metal skins (of fuel tank skin, trailing edge, painted 
skin, radome)  
(2) Resistive heating damage (bonding strap heating or exploding wires for a navigation light 
on a plastic vertical fin cap, diverter straps, pitot probe air tube, and radome) Magnetic 
 
Figure 50. Lightning strikes in aircraft with entry point and exit point 
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force effects (slamming together of two metal air pressure tubes in a radome mounted pitot 
system, in wing tip trailing edges, bent bond straps) 
(3) Arcing across bonds (over riveted joints with corrosion inhibiting coating, over fasteners 
or bonding jumpers with inadequate current carrying capacity, over fasteners in secondary 
structures such as wing tips, tail cones, wheel well doors, and flight control surfaces, over 
adhesive bonds, over hinges and bearings resulting in pitting or welding) 
(4) Sparking over structural joints  
(5) Punctures or flash-over over nonconductive composite material (radomes, composite 
material skin)  
(6) Damage of windshields, canopies, windows (direct or swept channel attachment to heating 
elements and damaging the connected power circuits) 
(7) Damages on electrically conductive composites (carbon fiber composite skins in Zone 1 
and 2 by lightning stroke currents by mechanism of pyrolysis and shock wave; primary 
 
 
Figure 51. Conductive strip in rudder may get lifted and damaged due to water ingress 
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structures, engine nacelle and pylon, flight control surface, leading edge devices, avionics 
bay, wing and empennage tips, fuel tank skin) 
(8) Damage of propulsion system (engine cowlings or nacelles, propeller and rotor blades, gear 
boxes damaged by lightning attachments)  
(9) Rain erosion of conductive lightning protection strip in Fig. 51 (degradation of conductive 
frame on wings and empennage) 
Lightning indirect effect events for which the following systems of concern fail: 
(1) Full authority digital engine control (FADEC) 
(2) Full authority electronic flight control (Fly-by-wire) 
(3) Supervisory control systems capable of initiating control inputs that could endanger flight 
safety 
(4) Fully or highly integrated cockpit instruments and displays 
(5) Electronic flight instrumentation system (EFIS) 
(6) Aircraft electric power control and distribution system 
(7) Electrical and avionics systems that include externally mounted apparatus, such as air data 
probes, heaters, actuators, and antennas 
Fuel system fire or explosion due to lightning strikes 
5.4.2 Drivers for Lightning Risk Events 
Drivers for each event are: (a) insufficient skin thickness; lightning arc energy 
concentration, lack of protective layer; (b) lack of an alternate, parallel path for the lightning 
current, (c) magnetic force acting on two metal current paths, and bonding strap bending (d) 
corrosion inhibition coating may reduce the lightning current flow, design may force individual 
fastener to carry more than 5 kA component A stroke current, hinges and bearings may have a 
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single point of contact, (e) inadequate design of joint or bonding resist
adequate, (f) no adequate electric path on radome, streamer development inside the radome, corona 
and charge formation for puncture, (g) electric field from lightning channel being swept across the 
windshield surfaces attaching to electric heating elements embedded, (h) inadequate material 
strength, lack of lightning current paths, degraded electrical conductivity, concentrated arc root (i) 
inadequate design of lightning protection for small airplanes and helicopters in terms of composite 
material lightning protection, (j) inadequate protection of conductive strips from rain erosion  
Drivers for lightning indirect effects for events (a) to (g) are: lack of proper shielding of 
wires and connectors, improper grounding and bonding, equipment susceptibility higher than 
requirement due to design issues (lack of lightning protection devices, EMI filters and others). 
Drivers for fuel system risk event are: sparking generation from lightning due to inadequate 
fasteners, flammable fuel vapor, and high fuel tank temperature. Ignition sources may be provided 
by dielectric puncture, burn through, hot spot formation, ohmic heating, exploding conductors on 
fuel system joints, wires, access doors, and tank surfaces. 
5.4.3 Impact Identification for Lightning Effects 
We identify the impacts of these lightning effect risk events as a next step. A risk event is 
a specific occurrence and is identified at a component, whereas the impacts of risk events in general 
have a system level implication and, for the most part, are multi-leveled, meaning impacts occur 
at a component level as well as at a system level. This multi-level impact is understood in terms 
of organizational hierarchy which should be addressed by considering the axis of organization in 
an architecture framework or taxonomy in context of systems architecture engineering.  
Impacts of direct lightning effect events are the compromised structural integrity, or compromised 
performance of the systems affected by the mechanical damages, thermal burns, or electrically 
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degraded bonding and grounding resistance. Impacts of indirect lightning risk events are the 
system level effects due to the disabled or upset system. Impacts of fuel system risk event are 
ignition of fuel system which could result in a loss of the aircraft.  
5.4 4 Drivers for the Lightning Impacts  
Since the impacts generally occur at a system level, the drivers for each impact should be 
found at the system level as well. The example drivers for these system level impacts are; lack of 
redundancies, inadequate bonding and grounding schemes of electrical systems including 
electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS), and absence of error corrections for subsystem 
electronics. These are the system configuration and design issues at the system level as well as at 
the unit level.  
 
 
Figure 52. Risk resolution diagram to be used for electromagnetic risk mitigation 
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5.5  Lightning Risk Resolution 
A lightning risk resolution process is shown in Fig. 52. Risk resolution is accomplished by 
developing risk action plans. In order to develop action plans, we examine the risk level of each 
risk event. If the risk level is higher than a predetermined threshold, then the risk mitigation actions 
such as risk event prevention actions or impact mitigation actions are performed. If the risk level 
is lower than the threshold, the risk is monitored but no immediate actions are required. A risk 
level is quantified by an expected loss value obtained by multiplying the risk event probability, 
impact probability, and total loss. Multiplication of the risk event probability and impact 
probability represents risk event likelihood and the total loss value represents the criticality of the 
affected system. These two entities, the likelihood and the criticality, are commonly found in risk 
or safety analysis procedures. Thus it is essential to assess the criticality of the lightning energy 
receptors in order to evaluate the risks. However, criticality may not always be quantifiable, and, 
in many cases, qualitative assessment of criticality may have to be used by categorizing the 
equipment into critical, essential, or non-essential. These criticality categories correspond to 
failure conditions of being catastrophic, hazardous (or major), and minor respectively. 
(A) Risk Assessment and Risk Monitoring 
The risk level of an event is assessed by calculating the expected loss value as follows:  
𝑃𝑒  × 𝑃𝑖 ×  𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿𝑒          (1) 
Where  
𝑃𝑒 = Probability of lightning risk event, 
𝑃𝑖 = Probability of lightning impact,  
𝐿𝑡 = Total loss, 
𝐿𝑒= Expected loss  
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Risk Map for Lightning in Aircraft
Threshold Curve Risk Event
Table 16. Risk table for lightning effects in aircraft 
 
Risk ID Risk Event









1.a Melt-through 1.0E-03 1.0E-04 1.0E-07 0.15 1.50E-08
1.b Resistive heating 1.0E-04 5.0E-03 5.0E-07 0.25 1.25E-07
1.c Magnetic force 1.0E-05 5.0E-05 5.0E-10 0.1 5.00E-11
1.d Arcing across bond 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-06 0.2 2.00E-07
1.e Bonding resistance 1.0E-02 1.0E-03 1.0E-05 0.2 2.00E-06
1.f Noncond comp 2.0E+00 3.0E-02 6.0E-02 0.5 3.00E-02
1.g Window 1.0E-02 3.0E-03 3.0E-05 0.3 9.00E-06
1.h Cond composite 1.0E-02 2.0E-02 2.0E-04 0.45 9.00E-05
1.i Propulsion 5.0E-02 1.0E-02 5.0E-04 1 5.00E-04
1.j Conductive strip 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-04 0.25 2.50E-05
2.a FADEC 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-04 0.8 8.00E-05
2.b FBW 1.0E-03 1.0E-02 1.0E-05 0.75 7.50E-06
2.c Control 1.0E-02 1.0E-01 1.0E-03 0.6 6.00E-04
2.d Cockpit display 2.0E-02 2.0E-01 4.0E-03 0.4 1.60E-03
2.e EFIS 5.0E-02 4.0E-02 2.0E-03 0.4 8.00E-04
2.f EPCD 1.0E-01 1.0E-01 1.0E-02 0.55 5.50E-03
2.g Avionic 3.0E-02 6.0E-02 1.8E-03 0.45 8.10E-04
3 Fuel system 1.0E-09 5.0E-01 5.0E-10 250 1.25E-07
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  Table 16 is a summary of the probabilities of risk events, probabilities of impact, total loss, and 
expected loss, and a risk map is developed in Fig. 53 based on the risk table. These are representative 
and it has been produced for illustration purposes. A logarithmic scale is used for risk likelihood y-
axis due to a widely varying range of the risk likelihood values. The way this lightning risk map is 
developed is as follows: Firstly, event probabilities are calculated as shown in Fig. 54. Then we 
estimate the risk likelihood by multiplying the probability of the risk event and the probability of 
the impact. As an example, the risk event probability of the resistance heating of a radome (risk 
event ID 1.b) is estimated to be 1 × 10−4 and the probability of the impact is estimated to be 5 ×
10−3. Thus the risk likelihood is calculated to be 5 × 10−7. If this event is realized, the total cost 
of repairing or replacing the radome as well as the associated damaged electronics inside the radome 
is estimated to be $250,000, which is the total loss. The expected loss is obtained by multiplying 
 
Figure 54. Top probability of lightning strike fault tree analysis 
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the risk likelihood 5 × 10−7 and the total loss of $250,000, which results in 12.5 cents of expected 
loss. This minuscule dollar figure is due to the very small probability of the risk event occurrence.  
The fuel system explosion risk calculation may be achieved by modeling the risk with the 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as sown in Fig. 54. The Fault Tree includes three components that 
contribute to the fuel tank explosion: (1) Lightning strike event on or near fuel tank, (2) existence 
of flammable fuel vapor, (3) spark ignition source inside the fuel tank. Probability values for these 
three components are AND gated because these three conditions should exist independently and 
simultaneously for the fuel tank ignition to occur. The lightning strike event probabilities may be 
obtained from historical lightning data for each aircraft flight scenarios or patterns. Fuel tank door 
gaskets or fasteners are analyzed or tested for sparking conditions. The top level FTA risk 
probability is calculated by this way and it is included in Table 17. 
Table 17. Lightning strike probability for each altitude segment 
 
 
Altitude range (ft) Probability
0 to 5,000 4.72E-10
5,000 to 10,000 7E-10
10,000 to 15,000 2.32E-09
15,000 to 20,000 1.83E-09
20,000 to 25,000 5.8E-10
25,000 to 30,000 3.9E-10
30,000 to 35,000 5.09E-10
35,000 to 40,000 1.36E-10
40,000 to 45,000 0
Total per flight 6.94E-09
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All of the risk events listed in Table 16 are plotted in the Fig. 53 risk map by continual 
application of this process. The threshold was determined to be five cents in this example. The 
threshold values may vary for each aircraft model, the nature of the project, and requirements, 
which are discussed and determined by stakeholders. The status of each risk event is clearly shown 
in the map with respect to a threshold curve. Some risk levels under the threshold may be 
acceptable to the project and are just monitored, but no actions are taken. For the risk events above 
the threshold curve, risk event preventive actions and impact contingency plans are performed as 
discussed in the next two sections. As the risk event probabilities and impact probabilities are 
reduced to an adequate level, the likelihood probability values are also decreased in proportion and 
the overall expected loss values are decreased. Continuation of this action moves the risk events 
from the location above the threshold line to the location below the threshold line. All risks of 
lightning effects in aircraft are monitored and mitigated this way with the goal to reduce all risk 
levels to an optimum level. 
(B) Risk Event Prevention for Lightning Strike Damage 
Previously 18 lightning risk events were identified and the corresponding drivers were 
discussed. Risk event prevention is discussed below by examining the drivers for each risk event.  
 (a) The driver of this event, the inadequate skin thickness suggests a risk event prevention 
method of increasing the skin thickness. It is possible to determine the optimal thickness of the 
skin for unpainted aluminum skins and for painted skins by lab testing. (b) Likewise, the driver of 
lack of arc root dispersion suggests treatment of an exterior surface with an electrically conductive 
bumpy finish to enhance the arc root dispersion; the driver of lack of protective layer suggests 
laminating the skin with a protective layer of thin metal applied with a nonconductive adhesive, 
(b) the driver of lack of adequate current path suggests, as a prevention, to provide alternate current 
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paths by making the corrosive inhibit coating even thinner and uniform, and to provide multiple 
conductive contacts, (c) the driver of two current paths in parallel suggests change in configuration 
design, and straighten the bonding straps and keep them short. In this manner, each driver suggests 
the following: (d) provide sufficient lightning current path through riveted joints or fasteners, 
control the thickness of adhesive bonds, provide multiple points of contact for hinges and bearings, 
(e) research into nature of bonding resistance including contact materials, shapes, surface areas, 
treatment of mating surfaces, and contact pressure, (f) installation of diverters or foil strips to 
intercept lightning flashes and divert them to nearby metal structure for radome, application of 
conductive material such as flame-sprayed metals over exterior of structures (other than radome), 
(g) test and select candidate windshield laminates, use of tough center ply, use of metal film heating 
element instead of fine embedded wires, employ surge suppression devices on power distribution 
circuits or buses, test candidate windshield and window design, bleed charges by anti-static 
coatings (h) strengthened material, provision of lightning current paths, arc root dispersion at 
multiplicity of points, use of expanded metal foil co-cured with the CFC laminate, (i) method of 
lightning protection for composite material for large aircraft may be used for small aircraft and 
helicopters, (j) study of conductive strip installation strength  Next we wish to discuss risk 
mitigation based on the drivers examination. 
 (a) to (g): Lack of proper shielding of wires and connectors suggests adequate shielding 
design for wire bundles and EMI backshell, the driver of improper grounding and bonding suggest 
sturdy design of grounding and bonding, and the driver of equipment susceptibility higher than 
threshold suggests design and installation of lightning protection devices such as meal oxide 
varistors (MOVs) and prudent subsystem design with EMI filters and others. 
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 The sparking driver for the fuel system ignition risk event suggests that prevention of 
sparking formation is required by fastener design improvement or by adding spark extinguishing 
sealant at the bottom end of the fasteners, the driver of flammable fuel vapor suggests necessity of 
installation of devices such as the nitrogen generation system (NGS) which fills the tank with 
nitrogen enriched air, the driver of high fuel tank temperature suggests advanced fuel cooling 
method implementation. We also may utilize guidance literatures such as FAA Advisory Circular 
25.981-1C for information on compliance with the certification requirements about prevention of 
ignition sources within the fuel tanks of transport category aircraft. 
(C) Impact Contingency Plan for Lightning Strike Damage  
Impacts and impact contingency plans occur at the system level. Consideration of the 
system level impact drivers for lightning direct effects, indirect effects, and fuel system failures 
suggests revised design implementation for each electrical subsystem. In other words, for each 
electrical subsystem, the revised design plan is accomplished by examining the drivers for the 
impacts in the same way the risk event prevention plans were produced by examining the drivers 
for the risk events. Thus the concept of redundancy, error correction coding, software design, 
system level bonding and grounding implementation and new material development are naturally 
proposed to establish the impact contingency plan. We note the system level knowledge is 
necessary and critical in proposing the system level solutions. This way of careful examination of 
drivers for risk events as well as for impacts within the context of the Standard Risk Model enables 
emergence of risk event prevention and impact contingency plans in a systematic and logical 
manner. 
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5.6 Chapter Conclusions 
Lightning risk analysis of aircraft systems has been performed from a systems engineering 
perspective. The Standard Risk Modeling approach was used for the analysis. Lightning currents 
propagate over the aircraft body from the entry point to exit point and affect the overall aircraft 
system directly as well as indirectly. Thus a system level approach to risk assessment and 
mitigation of lightning effects in aircraft is appropriate and beneficial. Typical lightning risk events 
were identified and their drivers have been discussed. Risk monitoring methodology as well as 
risk prevention and impact contingency plans for aircraft lightning hazards were developed. We 
have shown the risk analysis processes in detail so that this Standard Risk Model may be used for 
specific problem situations. 
Future work includes applying this approach to specific aircraft models and extending it to 
all subsystems and modules so that comprehensive lightning risk database may be established to 
aid aviation industry. More accurate probability quantification of lightning risk events and impacts 
based on analytical means, lab and aircraft level testing, and historical statistical analysis is 
required. Further development of this system level lightning effects evaluation modeling of aircraft 
with increased rigor is necessary. The model based systems engineering (MBSE) has been proven 
to be successful in dealing with many system level issues [122]. Application of MBSE to this 
lightning effect evaluation for aircraft is recommended. Validation and demonstration of the 
approach through experimental testing for specific case is also desirable.  
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6. Testing of Lightning Effects on a Fuel Tank 
 
 
The goal of this chapter is to show details of testing as a risk mitigation step for lightning 
risk event on fuel tanks. We have found fuel tank doors are vulnerable to lightning strike events. 
For this risk event, a driver-event study has been performed with the risk analysis model developed 
in Chapter 3. A major driver for the event we found was corrosion in the door gasket. We have set 
up a risk event prevention program which included a new design for the gaskets that are resistant 
to corrosion. This was an interdisciplinary work; it required lightning engineers, fuel engineers, 
material scientists and mechanical engineers. Design of the test waveform of lightning current is 
first presented. Then the lightning test background, test objective, approach conformity test are 
fully explained. The test procedure is developed. Test conduction, pass fail criteria discussion, and 
the test results are shown. This is an example of a specific case where the risk model is applied to 
obtain a solution to a risk event. The testing described in this chapter is a part of driver-event root 
cause analysis and risk mitigation activity. The risk model and approach are validated by showing 
some details of the risk analysis and mitigation via testing. 
6.1 Design of Lightning Test Waveform Component 
A lightning test is performed to verify and validate the methodology proposed in this work. 
In order to perform the test, the lightning waveform that are injected are investigated in this section. 
The power supply used for the test had 20kV, 0.1A rating, and lightning component A with 200kA 
peak and 2.5 × 106 𝐴2𝑠𝑒𝑐 action integral was desired. The capacitor bank was the design 
parameter. The test panel resistance was estimated to be 0.05 ohm. 
The waveform generation may be described as follows where  and  are waveform design 
constants which to obtain the form we desire. 
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𝐼 =  𝐼0(𝑒
−𝑡 −  𝑒−𝑡)          (1) 
Initial current values from [123] are used. 
I0 = 218,810 A 
 = 11,354 (1/s) 
 = 647265 (1/s) 
Energy conservation principle is applied. The initial energy contained in the capacitor is as follows 
where 𝑊𝑖 is the initial energy, 𝑊𝑓:is the final energy, 𝐶 is the capacitance, 𝐴𝑖 is the action integral 
and 𝑅is the resistance of the test article. 
𝑊𝑖 =  
1
2
 𝐶𝑉2 =  
1
2
 𝐶 4 × 108         (2) 
The final energy is as follows:  
𝑊𝑓 =  𝐴𝑖 × 𝑅 = 2.5 × 10
6 × 0.05        (3) 
Since 
𝑊𝑖 =  𝑊𝑓           (4) 
And  
𝐶 =  
2.5×106×0.05
2×108
= 6.25 × 10−4 = 625 µ𝐹       (5) 
Based on the calculated values, iteration was performed to get the value of . With  = 
9150, action integral = 2,507,184 was obtained which met the requirement. The component A 
waveform is plotted in Fig. 55 and is illustrated in Fig. 56: The design of waveform does not have 
to be done every time a test is conducted. However, in our work, we are establishing a risk analysis 
model and one of the steps is to gather all the background information necessary, thus it helps to 
understand the details of lightning waveforms. It also increases our understanding of the test and 
possible pitfalls of the test so that a proper testing can be conducted.  
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6.2 Lightning Test Background 
One of the lightning hazardous conditions is corrosion on fuel tank access door 
components. Thus corrosion represents the driver for the event of lightning damage effects. There 
are other actors for the event, but corrosion is a typical driver and investigating and understanding 
of corrosion in detail helps with our effort of lightning even risk mitigation. Corrosion present high 
impedance path to lightning currents and possible explosion condition to the fuel tank. The fuel 
tank access door components include access plates, gaskets, fasteners, plate cut-outs, clamp-rings, 
and the wing skin. Special attention was placed on gaskets and fasteners since they are susceptible 
to corrosion and they could be the factors in the ignition of the fuel tanks. The lightning current 
affects the fuel by conducted currents in general rather than the direct strikes due to the fact the 
fuel tanks are located in zone 3 defined in Chapter 5.  
 














Component A  (AI = 2.507 X 10^6), Delta T = 1 microsec, 
 = 9150
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The standard risk model technique with event driver analysis has determined that the corrosion 
was caused by moisture ingress into the fuel access door and skin interface, which was attributed 
to the gasket not providing a durable moisture barrier over time in this dynamic environment. To 
address corrosion issues, the risk analysis and mitigation technique proposed a revised fuel access 
door assembly that incorporates a new fuel door gasket with an improved moisture seal material 
and profile. Further research indicated the Mobilgrease 33 material. This new mesh filling material 
was chosen based on extensive testing and it provide better corrosion resistance than the currently 
used gasket filling material. This new mesh filling Mobilgrease 33 material that has corrosion-
inhibiting and lubricating properties along with a new rubber seal material and profile. This new 
gasket was determined to provide better corrosion protection than the current gasket. The gasket 
includes rubber around each of the attach fastener locations instead of mesh grommets. The mesh 
has been reduced to a single layer while maintaining the same thickness. The profile of the rubber 
seal part of the gasket has been increased in thickness and includes a bead to help seal out moisture. 
The seals are made from a new harder rubber material.  The test objective is stated in italics:  
 




2 kA 200 - 800 A
<500 μs < 5 ms 0.25 s<1<1s
100 kA
<500 μs
A B C D
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“The objective of this testing was to demonstrate that the installation of the fuel access doors with 
new gasket will not cause sparking within the fuel tank when Zone 3 lightning currents pass 
through this region.” 
6.3 Test Approach 
This lightning-conducted current test was conducted in accordance with the Aerospace 
Recommended Practice (ARP) 5416 Rev New “Aircraft Lightning Test Methods [124].” Testing 
utilized production parts installed in sections of wing skin representing the actual installation. 
Several small sheet metal parts were fabricated and a test fixture was built to secure the test articles. 
The panel backside, installed in a light-tight box, was monitored for arcing/sparking by cameras 
recording absence or presence of light. Two fuel door sizes were tested, 8x18 and 10x18. Each 
door assembly used a new gasket with the new mesh filling material. The two test assemblies, one 
for each fuel door size were subjected to a reduced Zone 3 current level. The magnitude of the 
reduced current level was determined by the ratio of the full Zone 1 current level times the ratio of 
the wing cross sectional area at the fuel access door location to the test panel cross sectional area. 
Each of the test assemblies were subjected to one test shot except the high impact door 
configuration which was subjected to five shots. The test report gives a detailed description of this 
test. 
6.4 Test Panel Configuration 
The test fixtures for each of the two sizes of fuel door configurations were made from 
sections of the lower skin panel assemblies from the following locations. Fig. 57 shows a typical 
fuel tank door which was used for the testing. 
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1. 10x18 high impact doors used between Ribs 3-6, regular doors used between Ribs 7-17 
2. 8x18 doors used between Ribs 17-23 and 24-25 
Each of the test fixtures were engineering supplied test parts and were made from sections of wing 
skin assembly approximately 20” wide by 24” long with a machined opening for a 10” x 18” or 8” 
x 18” fuel access door. The fixtures were made from scrapped wing skin assemblies from the wing 
factory or salvaged from airplanes in the fleet. 
 
6.5 Conformity Test  
For each of the test assembly, conformity was tested for the following items: 
(1) Verification that FAA Form 8130-3 is completed for each test gaskets prior to their use in 
testing. 
(2) Verification of fuel door part numbers. 
(3) Verification of clamp-ring part numbers. 
(4) Verification of assembly bolt part numbers. 
(5) Verification that the skin sections (fixtures), fuel doors, and clamp-rings contact surfaces 
are clean. 
 
Figure 57. Typical fuel tank door configuration 
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(6) Verification the laminate sheet configuration requirements. 
(7) Verification of door assembly. 
(8) Verification of torqueing of bolts. 
(9) Verification that the final test article (fixture, fuel door, clamp-ring, gasket and required 
laminate sheet) is mounted to a light-tight chamber. 
(10) Verification of requirements of photographic testing for all test configurations. 
6.6 Test Procedure 
The test was performed in the Lightning Lab which has the capability of delivering the 
current waveforms specified in ARP 5412B Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test 
Waveforms [125]. Test panels were mounted on a shielded light-tight test chamber and conducted 
currents applied through the panels. The shop removed panel finishes to provide grounds as 
needed. Cameras recorded absence/presence of sparking on back side. These tests were performed 
at room temperature. The test panels were mounted on the test chamber on a nonconductive back 
plane. The generator output was attached to the test article as shown, so current was driven into 
the edge of the test article, the generator return was attached to the opposite side. Cameras recorded 
the absence/presence of sparking on the back side of the test panels. Test levels were appropriate 
for Zone 3; i.e., reduced waveforms, A + C per ARP 5412B Aircraft Lightning Environment and 
Related Test Waveforms. Each test panel, referred to as Unit Under Test (UUT), was mounted on 
a light- tight chamber provided by the laboratory. The chamber provides a conductive enclosure 
that represents surrounding substructure and a shielded enclosure to simulate the wing interior 
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environment. The test chamber has been designed to allow flexibility to adapt to various panels 
sizes. UUT is measured approximately 20 x 24 inches. 
Prior to mounting the UUT on the light-tight chamber shown in Fig. 58, Fig. 59 and Fig. 
60, these steps were followed: 
• Resistance measurements were made from panel to access door on each UUT. 
• The UUT was visually checked for any surface abnormalities. 
• Pre Test photos were taken of both sides and recorded. 
• Ground shots were taken to establish the required waveform. 
• A verification (calibration) shot, for each new current probe setup was conducted with current 
probe cables disconnected from the probes, terminated in 50 ohms, and their outer 
conductor connected to the probe connector outer conductor. The oscilloscopes measured 
 
Figure 58. Test setup front view 
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Figure 60. Test set up side view 
 
Figure 59. Test set up inside view 
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6.7 Test Conduction  
Test conduction proceeded as follows: 
(1) UUT was mounted on the light-tight chamber. Position of the UUT, vertical or horizontal, 
was shop discretion. 
(2) No internal mirrors were arranged to view the test from various angles. 
(3) Standard blackout checks using a strobe or similar with camera lenses open were run to 
show that the box is free of light leaks. 
(4) Attached the generator output so the current was driven into the edge of the UUT. Attached 
the generator return in the same way but on the opposite side. The UUT was mounted on a 
non-conductive mounting plate. 
(5) The UUT was subjected to a reduced Zone 3 current level. The magnitude of the reduced 
current level was determined by the full Zone 1A current level times the ratio of the UUT 
cross sectional area to the wing cross sectional area at the fuel access door location times 
2. 
(6) The following explains the test criteria and current levels methodology for the 8 x 18 fuel 
access doors: 
a. Base on Zone 1A 200kA current level. 
b. Wing minimum cross sectional area at Rib 25 including spar webs and upper and lower 
skins is 8.8 𝑖𝑛2. 
c. UUT cross sectional area including the lower wing skin between stringers 6 and 8 
(including the stringer lands) is3 𝑖𝑛2. 
d. Drive is ratio of the UUT cross sectional area to Wing cross sectional area (0.34) times 
200kA (68 kA) times 6db safety factor gives 136 kA. 
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e. Pass Criteria is there is no light on film. 
(7) For the 8x18 access door, conducted current tests waveforms A, C were used. 
The following explains the test criteria and current levels methodology for the 10 x 18 fuel access 
door tests: 
(1) Base on Zone 1A 200kA current level. 
(2) Wing minimum cross sectional area at Rib 17 including spar webs and upper and lower 
skins = 21.88 𝑖𝑛2. 
(3) UUT cross sectional area including the lower wing skin between stringers 6 and 8 
(including the stringer lands) = 4.0 𝑖𝑛2 
(4) Drive is ratio of the UUT cross sectional area to Wing cross sectional area (0.18) times 
200kA (36.56 kA) times 6db safety factor = 73.13 kA. 
(5) Pass Criteria = no light on film 
For the 10x18 access door, conducted current tests waveforms A, C were used. Test levels are +/- 
10%. Verifying protection layers at these current levels was achieved by modifying the UUT by 
isolating approximately 50% of the door contact area with BMS7-335 Type VI grade B laminate 
sheet and loosening all the door fasteners 1/2-5/8 turn. In the event of a failure in this configuration, 
an unmodified UUT would be tested. Two Polaroid and one digital camera were set up to record 
any possible light within the box. A fast development type film, such as, Fujifilm FP3000B with 
3000 ASA was used. The Polaroid cameras were set for F4.7 aperture, and were placed so that the 
lens was no more than 1.5 meters from the fuel door test panel being tested, as specified in SAE 
ARP5416. Following standard safety procedures, the appropriate capacitor bank was charged to 
the required level and fired. Immediately after the application of each waveform set, camera 
shutters were closed and followed by a review of Polaroid exposures and digital images. Any light 
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observed on the photos was immediately reported to engineering. There were no failures to be 
reported to the EME AR. Waveforms were recorded and reviewed using the standard data 
acquisition system. Electronic versions were also maintained for later review. A detailed log was 
maintained that records plots and statistics for all shots taken. Resistance measurements were made 
at the completion of all the tests for that panel. Photos were taken of any unusual detail post test. 
Post Test Photos of the UUT were taken and documented. All tested panels are retained for 
disposition by Structures and EME engineering 
6.8 Test Pass Fail Criteria 
The test success criterion is no sparking and/or arcing within the light tight test chamber as 
shown in Fig. 61. Any detectable light on both Polaroid cameras would be a test failure. Detectable 
light on the digital camera was used as a means to confirm a failure, if light only shows on one 
Polaroid camera film. If light is observed on only one Polaroid camera film, then it was interpreted 











The light on film mechanism is shown in Fig. 62 and Fig. 63. A direct current attachment 
and indirect current attachment are shown in Fig. 62. The arcing mechanism is shown in Fig. 63 
where thermal sparking, outgassing and edge glow mechanisms are illustrated. Sparking occurs 
when there is an electrical breakdown of a gas that produces electrical discharge. The current 
through a normally nonconductive medium such as air produces a plasma and the plasma acts as 
a conductive path for arcing to occur.  
 
Figure 62. lightning attachment and ignition mechanism 
 













6.9 Test Results 
This test result includes all sections of the plan/procedure, a section of test results, and a 
section entitled conclusions. This section contains a summary of the test results with raw data 
included in the appendix. The data from the test equipment log and all FAA conformity 
documentation are also included in the appendix of this section. Three test assemblies for the 8 x 
18 access door and three for the 10 x 18 access door were available for this test. Test Panels 
received one shot per panel. Pre and Post Test photos and resistance measurements were made and 
recorded. A ground shot and noise shot was performed and the test setup was conformed. The test 
panel to ground resistance measurement was made and recorded in the log book and setup photos 
were taken. The test levels were per the test plan. There were no failures to this first group of five 
test panels. The tested panels were returned to the shop for disassembly. Two 8 x 18 and three 10 
x 18 test assemblies were reassembled, conformed and were labeled correctly. Test Panels received 
one shot per panel. Pre and Post Test photos and resistance measurements were made and recorded. 
A ground shot and noise shot was performed and the test setup was conformed. The test panel to 
ground resistance measurement was made and recorded in the log book and setup photos were 
taken. There were no failures to this second group of four test panels. Panel A (high impact fuel 
access door configuration) received five test shots. Pre- and post-test photos and resistance 
measurements were made and recorded. A ground shot was performed and the test setup was 
conformed. The test panel to ground resistance measurement was made and recorded in the log 
book and setup photos were taken. The test levels were per the test plan. There was no failure to 
both test panels. This null results represent successful outcome of the risk mitigation steps taken 
during this design and testing investigation. 
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6.10 Chapter Conclusions 
The risk analysis and mitigation procedures are followed to investigate the mechanisms, 
causes, and prevention of possible fuel tank explosion risk. The driver-event analysis as developed 
in Chapter 3 and demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5 are applied to the fuel tank doors. The drivers 
are identified to be corrosion of gaskets and fasteners. Thus the risk mitigation measure of having 
the fuel tank door free of corrosion is addressed with the risk model. The risk was viewed from 
the systems engineering point of view in the manner elaborated in Chapter 1. The standard risk 
modeling developed in Chapter 3 was used to identify, analyze the risk, develop mitigation 
techniques, and was verified by conducting a testing. This testing has demonstrated that the 
installation of the fuel access doors with the new gasket mesh filling material is the desired 
solution. The new material has corrosion-inhibiting and lubricating properties along with a new 
rubber seal material. The new gasket will not cause sparking within the fuel tank when Zone 3 
lightning currents pass through this region even with a reduction of the electrical contact area and 
with all installed fasteners under torqued. In addition to the specific value obtained from this risk 
mitigation technique via testing, our motivation was to show how the overall risk analysis and 








The risk analysis and mitigation model developed in this work has been applied to several 
situations related to lightning effects. Firstly, work has been done to assess the risk probability of 
lightning attachment at main wings. This assessment is an important step of the model and it 
provides the likelihood of the events. A summary list of important probabilities is shown in Table 
18. The risk probability may be quantified by several ways. One way is to evaluate the events in 
the lab. Another way is to calculate the probability. Evaluation of risk level could be a very 
complicated matter in order to evaluate the fuel tank explosion probability, we need to have the 
following information. 
Table 18. Summary of fuel tank explosion probability 
Parameter Numerical value 
Attachment likelihood of lightning on aircraft per 
year 
1 × 10−3 
Attachment likelihood per hour 4.2 × 10−7 
Attachment likelihood at zone 3 1 × 10−3 
Flammability of fuel tank Variable 
Defects on fasteners or gaskets 1 × 10−3 
Top level probability 1.08 × 10−9 
 
The calculation of the top level probability can be complicated since many factors must be 
considered. The most efficient way is to use the computer aided fault tree analysis program 
(CAFTA). In order to analyze the situation in more realistic way, each segments of altitude ranges 
were considered. Since the lightning strike probability values for each altitude segment are known, 
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the flammability was also calculated over each segment of altitude. Then the lightning probability 
at each segment was multiplied with the flammability of the fuel tank system for each segment of 
altitude. 
7.2 Lightning Risk Probability Calculation with FTA 
It is noted that the probability calculation example shown below from Fig. 64 to Fig. 72 is 
a typical representation of lightning risk event probabilities for commercial transportation aircraft. 
Above fault tree calculation shows the probability calculation for the range of 0 ft to 5,000 ft. 
The top probability for this altitude range is 4.72E-10.   
 
Figure 64. Fault Tree for the altitude range from 0 to 5000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 65 shows the probability calculation for the range of 5000 ft to 
10,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 7.0E-10. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the 
probability is calculated per flight in this figure.  
The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition probability during ascent, 
ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank being flammable, 
inadequate protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and inadequate 
nitrogen generation system.  
 
Figure 65. Fault tree for the altitude range from 5,000 to 10,000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 66 shows the probability calculation for the range of 10,000 ft to 
15,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 2.32E-9. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the probability 
is calculated per flight in this figure. The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition 
probability during ascent, ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank 
being flammable, inadequate protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and 
inadequate nitrogen generation system.  
 
 
Figure 66. Fault tree for the altitude range from 10,000 to 15,000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 67 shows the probability calculation for the range of 15,000 ft to 
20,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 1.83E-9. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the probability 
is calculated per flight in this figure.  
The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition probability during ascent, 
ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank being flammable, inadequate 
protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and inadequate nitrogen generation 
system.  
 
Figure 67. Fault tree for the altitude range from 15,000 to 20,000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 68 shows the probability calculation for the range of 20,000 ft to 
25,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 5.8E-10. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the probability 
is calculated per flight in this figure. The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition 
probability during ascent, ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank 
being flammable, inadequate protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and 
inadequate nitrogen generation system. These factors are calculated for different sections of the 
wings where the fuel tanks are located. Each factor for different sections of the wings are summed 
up to arrive the final probability numerical values for individual airplane.  
 
Figure 68. Fault tree for the altitude range from 20,000 to 25,000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 69 shows the probability calculation for the range of 25,000 ft to 
30,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 3.9E-10. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the probability 
is calculated per flight in this figure. The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition 
probability during ascent, ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank 
being flammable, inadequate protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and 
inadequate nitrogen generation system.  
 
Figure 69. Fault tree for the altitude range from 25,000 to 30,000 ft 
FUEL TANK IGNITION
DUE TO  LIGHTNING
STRIKE ZONE 3 FOR









Li ghtni ng attachment,
EME pr otect i on
f ai lur e,  f l ammable &
non-iner t  main tanks
G876
2.27E-10
Ignit i on Pr obabi l ity
Dur i ng Ascend Due to

















Ignit i on Pr obabi l ity
Dur i ng Descend Due to

















Li ghtni ng attachment,
EME pr otect i on
f ai lur e,  f l ammable &





The fault tree in Fig. 70 shows the probability calculation for the range of 30,000 ft to 
35,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 5.09E-10. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the probability 
is calculated per flight in this figure. The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition 
probability during ascent, ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank 
being flammable, inadequate protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and 
inadequate nitrogen generation system. 
  
 
Figure 70. Fault tree for the altitude range from 30,000 to 35,000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 71 shows the probability calculation for the range of 35,000 ft to 
40,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is 1.36E-10. This probability is later summed 
up with the rest of the probability values to get the final individual probability. Note the probability 
is calculated per flight in this figure. The FTA calculation is done as a combination of the ignition 
probability during ascent, ignition probability during descent and contributions by the fuel tank 
being flammable, inadequate protection of fastens and other component around the fuel tank, and 
inadequate nitrogen generation system. These factors are calculated for different sections of the 
wings where the fuel tanks are located. Each factor for different sections of the wings are summed 
up to arrive the final probability numerical values for individual airplane.  
 
Figure 71. Fault tree for the altitude range from 35,000 to 40,000 ft 
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The fault tree in Fig. 72 shows the probability calculation for the range of 40,000 ft to 
45,000 ft. The top probability for this altitude range is assumed to be zero since there is rarely a 
lightning strike over this range. Thus this probability does not affect the final individual 
probability. Note the probability is calculated per flight in this figure. The FTA calculation is done 
as a combination of the ignition probability during ascent, ignition probability during descent and 
contributions by the fuel tank being flammable, inadequate protection of fastens and other 
component around the fuel tank, and inadequate nitrogen generation system. These factors are 
calculated for different sections of the wings where the fuel tanks are located. Each factor for 
different sections of the wings are summed up to arrive the final probability numerical values for 
individual airplane.  
 
Figure 72. Fault tree for the altitude range from 40,000 to 45,000 ft 
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The average lightning distribution is shown in Fig. 73. The average lightning strike distribution is 
the highest between 10,000 ft and 15,000 ft as shown. The average flammability distribution for 
the right main outboard fuel tank over the altitude ranges is shown in Fig. 74. The flammable 
minutes goes up as the altitude goes up. This opposite trend between the lightning probability and 
flammability implies the actual fuel tank explosion rate is lower than the calculated rate using 
simplistic assumption of constant lightning probability and flammability. After considerations of   
 
Figure 73. Lightning strike probability distribution over altitude ranges 
 
Figure 74. Flammable minutes vs. altitude ranges for right main outboard fuel tank for ascent phase 
(L) and descent phase (R) 
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flammability, lightning strike probability and FTA calculation of fuel tank ignition with these 
factors, the final results are shown in  Table 19 where the probabilities for each altitude range are 
summed up to produce the top level fuel tank ignition risk probability per flight and per hour. 
7.3 Risk Resolution Strategies 
For the remaining chapter, various risk response strategies are discussed. The risk modeling 
gives options for difference responses for difference airplane scenarios.  
Risks may be accepted if risks are determined to be tolerable and do not affect the safety 
of the airplanes. Airlines conduct inspection of the surface of airplane if there were reports of 
lightning strikes. If the inspection does not point out sever damage, the airplane may be dispatched 
without further repair until the airplane is located at a major repair facility (MRO). Another 
example of risk acceptance can be cited for a situation where walk around finds missing bonding 
jumpers. If there are redundant bonding jumpers next to the missing jumper location, the risk may 
Table 19. Top level probability based on altitude range consideration 
Altitude range (ft) Probability (per flight) 
0 to 5,000  4.72E-10 
5,000 to 10,000  7E-10 
10,000 to 15,000 2.32E-09 
15,000 to 20,000 1.83E-09 
20,000 to 25,000 5.8E-10 
25,000 to 30,000 3.9E-10 
30,000 to 35,000 5.09E-10 
35,000 to 40,000 1.36E-10 
40,000 to 45,000 0 
Total per flight 6.94E-09 (or 1.08E-09 per hour) 
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be acceptable on a time-limited basis. The missing jumpers should be restored to the delivery 
configuration after a limited time elapses.  
Risks may be mitigated. Lightning risks while airplane is parked in a tarmac can be 
mitigated by installing grounding cables. It is observed that the parked airplanes get hit with 
lightning strikes. Personnel safety may be compromised and airplane may get damaged. Grounding 
the airplane with cables reduce the risks by providing paths for the lightning currents to flow. 
Risks may be acceptable and mitigated for the cases when the airplane is being worked on in the 
hangar.   
Risks may be avoided. As airplanes fly the pre-determined path, if there are storm are 
reported, pilots may change the path and go around the storms. 
Risks may be transferred. For instance, if there is module development that are highly 
technical, the technical risk may be transferred to the experts who works for suppliers.  
Table 20 below summarized this discussion of various risk responses. 
Table 20. Risk response strategies 
Risk response strategy Airplane example 
Acceptance Lightning inspection, and missing bonding 
jumpers for dispatch 
Mitigation Grounding while parked on tarmac (1 – 3 points) 
Acceptance & Mitigation Grounding while airplane is being worked on 
Avoidance Flying away from storms, lightning sensing 
devices 
Transfer Subcontracting to supplier  
 
In the next section, several examples are shown for the risk responses such as risk acceptance, risk 
mitigation, risk avoidance and risk transfer which are shown in the Table 20. 
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7.4 Risk Acceptance and Mitigation for Airplane Grounding Policy 
While airplanes are worked on for maintenance or repair purposes, questions arise about 
grounding practices of airplanes for safety.  There are at least four situations as follows for 
grounding considerations:  
(1) Risk is accepted when the airplane is parked or is being serviced during turnaround 
operation. Static grounding of the airplane by positive grounding means is not necessary. 
This does not include those situations where maintenance activities are being performed in 
or about the airplane. 
(2) Risk is accepted when performing pressure refueling or pressure defueling of the airplane. 
Static grounding of the airplane by positive grounding means is not necessary.  
(3) Risk should be mitigated when electrical bonding between the airplane and the refueling 
vehicle is required. Static grounding of the airplane by positive grounding means is 
recommended during overwing refueling or other fuel related activities. 
(4) Risk should be mitigated when performing maintenance activities using devices such as 
lights, power tools, and instruments powered from external electrical power sources. 
Electrical bonding between the airplane and the refueling source is also required. Static 
grounding of the airplane by positive grounding means is required.  
By having these risk responses in advance, airplane operations on tarmac and in hangar can be 
conducted efficiently for the optimum safety of airplanes and airplane operations. 
7.5 Risk Mitigation by Bonding Jumper Design and Installation 
To mitigate lightning and HIRF risks, bonding jumpers shown in Fig. 75 are frequently 
designed and installed on aircraft. This section covers the design principles for such bonding 
jumpers for lightning protection purposes.  
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Let’s use 0.25 x 10^6 [A2 s] for Zone 2 (component D) where the action integral is 0.56 x 10^6 for 
the 10 AWG wire with cross section 0.0526 cm2 
A design value k is defined and found below where 𝜌20 is resistivity at 20C, 𝐴 is the cross 
sectional area of the conductor in cm2, 𝐼 is the current though the conductor in ampere, 𝑐 is the 







0.092 × 8.89 × 0.0526
= 2.387862  (1) 
∆T =  
2.387862
1−0.00393×2.387862
= 2.410483      (2) 






0.12 × 7.9 × 0.0526
= 86.23719     (3) 
∆T =  
86.23719
1−0.001×86.23719
= 94.3759       (4) 
Although stainless steel or copper can handle this temperature rise, outer jackets may not. 
Determination of temperature rise on bonding jumpers is used as one of the design criteria. 
 
Figure 75. Connection of the grounding cable from the landing gear to ground post in airport 
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7.6 Airplane Lightning Risk Mitigation with Multiple Wire Grounding 
The bonding jumper design was discussed in the previous section, we want to discuss 
airplane lightning risk mitigation by using multiple wire grounding. A modeling of this situation 
is shown in Fig. 76 where the voltage development and temperature rise are the criteria for 
designing the multiple wire grounding. The voltage development is the result of two factors. The 
first factor is the inductance. The wire inductance is comprised of self-inductance as shown in 
equation (5) and mutual inductance as shown in equation (6). Wire resistance shown in equation 




















)       (6) 
𝑅 = 𝜌𝑙/𝐴           (7) 
Where 𝐿 is self inductance, ℎ is the distance above ground, 𝑟0 is the radius of the conductor, 𝑑𝐺  
is the distance between generator and receptor wires, 𝑑𝐺𝑅is the distacne betgween generator and 
reference wires, 𝑑𝑅  is the distance between reference and test wires and 𝑟𝑤0 is the raius of wires. 
𝜌 is the resistivity, 𝑙 is the length of the wire, 𝐴 is the area of the wire cross-section. These three 




+ 𝑖𝑅          (8) 
The equation (8) shows the totall volatage developed is due to the self inductance, mutual 
inductance and resistivity. This voltage development is shown in Fig. 76 with OPM modeling. It 
shows the form where this devlopment occurs, the process of voltage development and the state 
change in the cable for voltage and temperature. 
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The voltage calculated is compared to the voltage for arcing condition generally available in 
literature. Generally inductive component contributes the most to the voltage development while 
the resistance component is not significant. Thus the length of the cable is a significant factor.  
Also the number of cables is inversely proportional to the voltage development. N number of 
cables in parallel will reduce the voltage by the factor N. Thus adequate number of grounding 
cables can be determined by considering the voltage developed and what is practically possible 
within the airport environment. 
7.7 Risk Deferral with Lightning Damage Inspection 
Risk deferral is another one of the risk resolution strategies. As an example for lightning 
strikes, inspection of aircraft after pilots report lightning strikes can be discussed. Airliners are 
required to have detailed inspections after pilots’ reports. However it takes proper equipment and 
resources to do the detailed inspection. If initial inspection by binoculars does not show damages, 
repairs can be postponed for limited time which could be 5 to 10 flight cycles until the airplane is 
at a MRO (Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul) facility. Risk may be deferred but with some 
conditions:  
(1) Performance of all of the external surface examinations specified, deferring the portion of 
the examinations of aircraft external surfaces that cannot be accessed above 8 meters. 
(2) Supplementing of these inspections with examinations of upper and lower surfaces of all 
control surfaces and both left and right sides of the vertical stabilizer (including rudder, 
 
Figure 76. Voltage and temperature development due to lightning current flow on a cable 
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rudder tab, and static dischargers) using binoculars from the most advantageous position 
possible. 
(3) The balance of the external surface examinations to be completed within predetermined 
flights. 
7.8 Risk Management of a Fleet as a System of Systems 
In this section, we consider the fleet level risk analysis of airplanes. The question whether 
the fleet level airplanes may be treated as a system of systems (SoS) is also explored. We introduce 
the concept of system of systems first. It was Kenneth Boulding who used the term SoS first in 
1956 in public literature [126]. Boulding imagined SoS as a “gestalt” in theoretical construction 
creating a “spectrum of theories” greater than the sum of its parts. The term SoS is defined to be a 
set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into 
a larger system that delivers emergent activities. A fleet of airplanes is a loosely coupled SoS. A 
fleet of airplanes meet the SoS criteria because of the fleet actions by FAA and airplane 
manufacturers. Risk analysis is also done at the fleet level under FAA governance 
A fleet of airplanes must meet compliance requirements by FAA for governance but not 
for management purposes. Fleet level risk or average risk is calculated for average conditions for 
tens of thousands cases for temperature and NGS availability via Monte Carlo analysis, 
represented by Risk Associated Compliance Period (RACP) determination. A specific risk is 
calculated for a single airplane at a specific condition and environment. We note that a fleet of a 
model (for instance, 777 fleet) is subject to the following activities: 
(1) Service Bulletin published by Manufacturers 
(2) AD issued by FAA 
(3) Fleet Team meetings 
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(4) Fleet Team exchanges 
(5) PEDs regulation is for model fleet  
(6) Multi-operator messages  
(7) Monitoring by Airplane Health Management System (AHMS) in real time and making 
parts ready for maintenance before landing 
These conditions are the reasons for the possibility of airplane fleet to be a SoS. Airplanes in a 
fleet do not communicate or interact each other. However, as we will see in the next section, a 
system could be considered a SoS of loose coupling if there is a purposeful action on the fleet as a 
whole (collaborative) or each member of the system could participate in certain activities but they 
may withdraw anytime (virtual SoS of coalition type). The seven activities of a fleet stated above 
qualify a fleet for collaborative or virtual SoS. Thus a SoS concept is applicable to a fleet of 
airplanes and the tools available for SoS can be made available for a fleet of airplanes. 
DoD system engineering guide in 2008 is shown in Fig. 77. Categories are in order of how 
tightly coupled the component systems are from loosely to tightly. According to this criteria, the 
fleet is a collaborative or a virtual SoS: There are purposeful activities for the fleet, but there is no 
 
Figure 77. Categories of SoS per system engineering guide 
Directed: Integrated Sos is built 
and managed for purpose
Acknowledged: SoS shares management 
responsibility, recognized objectives
Collaborative: Purposeful, but no 
SoS management = Federated
Virtual: Participate for immediate needs 
but may withdraw at any time = Coalitions
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intentional fleet management. Compliance period by FAA AD may be given (collaborative SoS) 
or compliance could be done at the next opportunity (Virtual). Also the fleet is becoming e-enabled 
SoS via AHMS. The following seven criteria are generally used for SoS determination [127]. 
(1) Operational independence of the individual system: Each airplane is a system 
independently operated by operators. 
(2) Managerial independence of the individual system: Each airplane is managed 
independently by airliners. 
(3) Geographical distribution: Airplanes are dispersed geographically. 
(4) Emergent behavior: As a SoS, operators attend Fleet Team meetings, interact via Fleet 
Team exchanges, must incorporate AD related Service Bulletins (FAA requirements for 
safety related). 
(5) Evolutionary development: Fleet is created, they grow and evolve, is modified and ceased.  
(6) Self-organization: Fleet is organized loosely by fleet management teams (operators and 
manufacturers), and they respond to FAA directives. 
(7) Adaptation: Fleet adapts to new regulatory requirements (external changes and perceptions 
of the environment). 
Airplane fleet meet these seven categories of SoS determination as a loosely coupled type. Now 
that SoS characteristics of a fleet is explored, we wish to conduct a risk analysis for a fleet. Up to 
this point, we have explored risk analysis of at an individual level quite extensively. Now we would 
like to apply the risk concept at the fleet level. The steps to take for a fleet level risk starts with 
risk calculation of individual system for a lightning example. We start with the probability 
calculation for lightning strikes for an airplane and the lightning strike probability for zone 3 where 
fuel tanks are located. Then lightning probabilities for ascent flight path and for descent flight path 
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are calculated. Then as we discussed earlier in this chapter, the probability for each segment of 
altitude is calculated. We have subdivided the altitude into nine ranges. This altitude consideration 
is also applied to the flammability calculation as well. Once the lightning strike probabilities and 
the flammability of fuel tanks are computed for each altitude segment, the two can be combined 
for each altitude range and combined to arrive at the top probability. These steps are summarized 
below. 
(1) Lightning strike probability for Transport airplane: typically 0.001  
(2) Zone 3 lightning strike probability: typically 0.0033 
(3) Lightning Probability during ascent: typically 0.35  
(4) Lightning strike probability during descent: typically 0.65 
(5) Probability for altitude segment  0 ft to 5000 ft: typically 0.17 
(6) FTA produces fuel tank explosion probability: typically 4.72E-10 
(7) Add all altitude segments: typically 1.08E-9/hr  
 
Figure 78. RACP generation flow modeled with OPM informational objects 
147 
The process up to this point generates individual risk probabilities. The following steps then 
generates the fleet level risk based on the individual risk probability.  
(1) Obtain the fleet size: an example 143 
(2) Obtain the estimated airplane life: an example 82,000 hours 
(3) Calculate the fleet life: fleet size multiplied by airplane life 
(4) Calculate the risk of accident over fleet life: individual airplane fuel tank explosion times 
fleet life: an example of the fleet risk 3% 
(5) FAA publishes fleet level risk requirement: an example 10% 
(6) Calculate the SACT (Service Action Compliance Time) if repair is required 
As we noted, the first part of the calculation yields the individual risk. The second part of the 
calculation yields the fleet risk. By comparing the fleet risk to the requirement risk from FAA, a 
determination can be made as to the next action. This process is modeled with OPM in Fig. 78. 
We note that concept can also be an object in the OPM model. It is called informational object in 
OPM environment. Thus the probabilities can be considered as informational objects. These 
objects are shown on the left side of Fig. 78. These objects are processed to calculate the individual 
probabilities. This calculation is a process and shown as an ellipse in Fig. 78. Then the result is 
process once again by fleet risk calculation process. The fleet risk is evaluated against the FAA 
fleet requirement and a judgment is made whether we should proceed to RACP design or not.  If 
the judgment is to design RACP, then the service action preparation time and the service action 
compliance time should be determined. These two time periods in combination are called managed 
exposure period. The details are shown in Fig. 79. 
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7.9 Chapter Conclusions  
In order to validate the developed model, several case studies have been conducted in the 
areas of risk analysis, risk acceptance and risk mitigation. As an example of risk analysis, 
procedural probability calculation with CAFTA was shown. The features noteworthy was 
inclusion of altitude factors in the calculation. The lightning probabilities were calculated for each 
range of altitude and later they were summed to get the final probabilities.  
For risk acceptance case study, lightning strike damage inspection was considered. 
Although a pilot may report lightning strike incidents, if preliminary inspections show there are 
no noticeable damages, the airplane may be dispatched until the airplane flies to a major repair 
facility. In other words, we accept calculated risks.  
 
Figure 79. RACP example of airplane fleet as a system of systems 
SAPT: Service Action Preparation Time  
SACT: Service Action Compliance Time 
MEP: Managed Exposure Period  














For risk mitigation case study, grounding cable design was considered. The voltage 
development factor due to lightning current flow and the temperature rise factor should be 
considered to arrive an optimum number of grounding cables. If the temperature rise does not 
exceed the melting point of materials for cables including outer jacket and the voltage development 
does not exceed estimated maximum level of voltage due to lightning, it will be acceptable. As the 
number of cables increases, the total inductance decreases and the voltage developed will decrease. 
The same logic applies to resistance as well, which contributes to the voltage development and the 
temperature rise.  
Another example of risk mitigation was for the fleet level risk. Fleet may be considered to 
be a system of systems of loose coupling. Once the individual risk was calculated, the fleet level 
risk can be calculated by multiplying the individual probability and the total fleet flight hours. 
Typically FAA requires a fixed number for the fleet risk such as 10%, so the question whether risk 
mitigation should occur in the form of repair may be determined with the fleet risk calculation. If 
it is determined that repair is necessary, a risk associated compliance period should be designed. 
This enables engineers to practically address the fleet level risk. The risk associated compliance 
period is consisted of service action preparation time (SAPT), service action compliance time 
(SACT), and a period for margin. When the safety determination is made the service action 
preparation time (SAPT) starts. When the fully mitigating service action is issued, the service 
action preparation time ends and the service action compliance time starts. The service action 
preparation time and service action compliance time together are called managed exposure period 
(MEP). The managed exposure period and the margin together are called the risk associated 
compliance period, which is shows diagrammatically in Fig. 79. 
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8. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
This work is concerned with the system level risk analysis of electromagnetic and lightning 
effects in aircraft systems. The purpose is to add rigor to the risk analysis methodology and to 
provide details of how system level risk analysis may be done. In order to achieve the goal, 
following measures have been taken:  
1. Discussed the general emergence theory and the engineering emergence theory 
2. Viewed the system level risk as an emergent property of a system  
3. Developed extended SAI method for ilities translation to subsystem level 
4. Developed additional system architecture principles for more effective systems 
thinking 
5. Utilized the systems engineering approach for the E3 and lightning effects via risk 
analysis  
6. Applied Object Process Methodology to E3 and lighting risk analysis and resolution  
7. Examined the fleet level risk and presented risk associated compliance period 
estimation method  
The result was the development of a risk management approach which may be streamlined 
and used for engineering product development and service engineering over lifecycle. 
Integrated approach developed in this work would benefit aerospace organizations in terms 
of reducing cost and schedule and enhancing the quality and safety of aircraft. 
This research focused primarily on electromagnetic risk management in aircraft. Additional 
work is required to apply this approach to other areas such as communications and navigation 
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